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This study examined the challenges confronting private equity funds. These funds 
face governance challenges, including a lack of transparency and disclosure to 
investors.  
Investor protection in leading jurisdictions ranges from voluntary self-
regulation, to minimal regulatory measures and an exhaustive regulatory approach. 
These approaches have, however, proven limited with regard to both application and 
their effectiveness in promoting investor protection, and market efficiency.  
Two methods have been identified to address governance challenges. The legal 
tools include facilitating transparency, the disclosure of information and the 
promotion of investor protection. These tools include: 
1) A negotiated structural approach, with side letters that provide individual 
investors with information and the establishment of an advisory board with 
limited control over the fund’s operations; and 
2) A co-regulatory approach, which combines contractual, self-regulation, and 
financial regulations to address governance challenges efficiently and 
effectively. 
Both methods have potential to address the governance challenges and increased 
investor concerns that have arisen as a result of the manner in which private equity 
funds operate.  The approach suggested by this study is based on an understanding of 
private equity as an asset class. The approach is effective and efficient. It encourages 
and promotes investor protection, while at the same time promoting the South 
African private equity industry as a flexible and lucrative market. 
There has been limited critical legal assessment of governance mechanisms in the 
context of private equity. This study thus contributes to the body of knowledge on 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 






1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………....…...1  
1.1 Background………………………………………………………..........1 
1.2 Problem Statement……………………………………………………...2 
1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation……………………………………….6   
CHAPTER TWO………………………………………………………………..8 
2. THE NATURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY…………………………………....8 
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………..8 
2.2 Private Equity Defined………………………………………………….8 
2.3 The Supply of Capital and Institutional Investors……………………....9 
2.4 Types of Investment Strategies…………………………………………10 
2.5 Implementation Models………………………………………………...11 
2.6 Private Equity Investment Fund Vehicles……………………………....11 
2.7 The Internal Arrangements………………………………………...........13 
2.8 Fund Manager as the Financial Intermediary…………………………...14 
2.9 Issues and Concerns…………………………………………………….15 
(a) Investor Protection……………………………………………...........15 
(b) Overregulation or Inappropriate Regulation of the Industry………...17 
CHAPTER THREE……………………………………………………………...18 




3.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………….18 
3.2 Forms of Private Equity Funds in South Africa………………………...20 
(a) The Limited Liability Partnership…………………………………...20 
(b) The Bewind Trust……………………………………………………23 
(c) The Structure of a Private Equity Investment……………………….24 
(i) Fiduciary Duties………………………………………..........25 
(ii) Contracts…………………………………………………….25 
3.3 The General Regulatory Framework…………………………………....27 
3.4 Regulations which Support the Growth of the Industry………………..32 
(a) Pension Funds…………………………………………………………32 
(b) Public Investment Corporation…………………………………...........34 
3.5 Regulations Proposed to Deal with the Issues and Concerns…………...34 
(a) Treating Customers Fairly…………………………………………….34  
(b) The National Treasury Policy Document………………………...........35 
(c) Private Equity Scandal’s Influence on the Proposed Regulations…….37 
(i) The Fidentia Asset Management Scandal…………………...37 
(ii) The Tri-Linear Asset Management Scandal………………....38 
(iii) Influence on the Proposed Regulations……………………...39 
3.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………40 
CHAPTER FOUR……………………………………………………………….42 
4. UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S 
REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS………………………….42 
4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………..42 
4.2 Private Equity Funds in the United Kingdom……………………..........43 
(a) Forms of Private Equity Funds ……………………………………….43 
(b) The General Regulatory Framework………………………………….45 
4.3 Private Equity Funds in the United States of America………………….50 
vii 
 
(a) Forms of Private Equity Funds……………………………...................51  
(b) The General Regulatory Framework………………………………….55 
4.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………....63 
CHAPTER FIVE………………………………………………………………...66 
5. THE VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION AND REGULATORY 
APPROACH………………………………………………………………....66 
5.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………….66 
(a) Voluntary Self-Regulation Approach………………………………68 
(b) The Regulatory Approach…………………………………………..70 
CHAPTER SIX………………………………………………………………….72 
6. APPLICATION AND EVALUATION OF APPROACH………………….72 
6.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………..72 
(a) Monitoring Risk Mitigation Strategy………………………………..73 
(i) Structural Approach – Private Monitoring Solutions………..74 










     





While the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) have 
applied a regulatory approach to the private equity fund (fund),1 funds in the 
Republic of South Africa (South Africa) are not subject to specific regulations or 
legislation and no government body is responsible for regulatory oversight of such 
funds. This is problematic because their performance cannot be adequately assessed 
by investors. Non-regulation creates concerns relating to transparency and disclosure, 
resulting in inadequate investor protection. 
There have been instances where fund managers have exploited the lack of 
regulatory oversight. These scandals illustrate how a lack of regulation leads to 
serious problems of non-transparency and non-disclosure in the management of a 
fund, deficits in investor confidence, and serious threats to economic growth and 
stability. The Fidentia Asset Management scandal (Fidentia scandal) in South Africa 
is a good example.  Fidentia asset managers used institutional investors’ funds for 
purposes other than what they were mandated for.2 As a result of lack of adequate 
disclosure and transparency, investors suffered significant losses. A similar scenario 
played out in the Tri-linear Asset Management scandal (Tri-linear scandal).3  Such 
scandals could reduce investor confidence, resulting in a reduced appetite for 
investment in private equity.  
The Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC scandal (Bernie Madoff 
scandal) in the USA is another example of the problems exposed by the Fidentia and 
Tri-linear scandals.4 As with Fidentia, there was a lack of adequate transparency and 
disclosure, which resulted in the perfect conditions to conduct a Ponzi scheme.5 The 
problem was not uncovered by the regulatory bodies. Instead, Bernie Madoff, the 
                                                          
1 Paul Dickson The Asset Management Review 3 ed (2014). 
2 Brown and Others v Financial Service Board and Others (679/2007) [2013] ZAWCHC 142; S v 
Brown 2015 (1) SACR 211 (SCA). 
3 Kawie v Master of The High Court of SA 2012 JDR 1190 (WCC) (unreported);  Infra note 283  




fund manager, notified the authorities after the fact.6 The Madoff scandal revealed 
loopholes in the regulatory environment not just for hedge funds, but for private 
equity funds as well. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The problem addressed by this study is best demonstrated by an example. A fund is 
formed as a result of an agreement between the fund manager and institutional 
investors. Internal arrangements are regulated by a contract. In terms of the contract, 
the fund manager controls the affairs and conducts the business of the fund. Because 
the fund is a legal investment ‘vehicle’ such as a partnership or a bewind trust, 
certain regulations and legislation do not apply. For example, if the ‘vehicle’ were 
structured as a company, the South African Companies Act7 (the Companies Act) 
would apply. However, the fund will be regulated by the common law and other 
relevant statutes. As will be shown, this form of regulation may not provide adequate 
safeguards.  In terms of disclosure and transparency, the fund manager is not obliged 
to account to investors and may conduct the affairs of the fund as he/she sees fit. This 
may jeopardise investors and impact negatively on the economy, especially when the 
investor is an institutional investor such as the Mineworkers’ Provident Fund (MPF); 
or university endowment fund among others. The concerns arising from this example 
are discussed below. 
One of the concerns is the lack of oversight of funds in South Africa. For 
example, a fund does not have to be registered with a government agency. However, 
the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act 8 requires fund 
managers to register as financial services providers. Fund managers may also register 
as members of the South African Venture Capitalist and Private Equity Association 
(SAVCA), a voluntary association.9 However, they are not obliged to do so. While 
this voluntary association regulates the affairs of funds, concerns have been raised 
that voluntary regulation might not be effective.10  
                                                          
6 Amir Efrati et al December 2008 ‘Top Broker Accused of $50 Billion Fraud’ The Wall Street 
Journal 12 December 2008, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122903010173099377, 
accessed on 10 November 2014. 
7 Act No. 71 of 2008. 
8 Act No. 37 of 2002. 
9 South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA), available at 
http://www.savca.co.za/membership/become-a-savca-member/, accessed on 12 February 2015. 
10 Julia Black ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australia Journal of Legal Philosophy 2. 
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As revealed by the example above, another concern is the structure set up to 
manage the private equity fund. A fund is formed either through a limited partnership 
or a bewind trust.11  These structures evade certain regulations which serve to protect 
the economy and the investor. The specific concerns in this regard include a lack of 
transparency and disclosure of information to investors. 
Investors depend on the fund manager to provide information.12 However, even 
when information is disclosed, there is little that investors can do with it. Investor 
control is usually minimal.13 Furthermore, investors may not be able to exit the fund, 
and in the event that they are able to do so, they face a host of further problems.14 
Some critics also argue that the lack of transparency enables many funds to take 
advantage of their status as limited partnerships or bewind trusts to pay top managers 
exorbitant fees with little fear of being found out.15 Therefore being private in this 
sense has costs.16 Subject to limited controls, the fund manager can do whatever they 
want with little threat of investor retaliation.  
There is also a tendency to inflate the reputation of the fund manager. It is 
submitted that, from a theoretical perspective, knowledge of an investment 
manager’s reputation is less useful than knowledge of investments made by the fund 
through ensuring greater transparency. Bernie Madoff and Fidentia Asset 
Management are perfect examples. It is submitted that had these funds been more 
transparent and ensured adequate disclosure, these scandals could have been averted. 
However, to quote Warren Buffett, ‘You only find out who is swimming naked when 
                                                          
11 South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association ‘Three Decades: An account of the 
rise and establishment of South African Private Equity’. February 2015, available at  
http://www.savca.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Three-Decades-Magazine-2015.pdf  accessed on 
20 February 2015. 
12 Jennifer Payne ‘Private Equity and its Regulation in Europe’ (2011) University of Oxford Legal 
Research Paper Series 1.  
13 Joseph McCahery ‘Private Equity Regulation: A Comparative Analysis’ (2010) Journal of 
Management and Governance 197. 
14 Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan ‘Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of Private 
Equity Markets’ (2007) 31 Journal of Banking and Finance 3218. 
15 The Economist ‘Barbarians in the Dock’ 3 March 2007, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/8776229, accessed on 10 November 2014. 
16 Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda ‘The Economics of Private Equity Funds’ (2010) The Review of 
Financial Studies 2303. 
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the tide goes out’.17 In other words, one only becomes aware of the true state of 
affairs when it has already occurred. 
Those that believe that the concerns raised are unjustified argue that the 
investor is skilled and should thus be able to address such issues.18 This study 
therefore assesses the issues and concerns raised regarding funds in order to 
determine whether or not the regulation of such funds in South Africa is effective 
and efficient.  
This study aims to contribute to our understanding of the regulation of funds in 
South Africa and the manner in which it differs from other jurisdictions. It provides a 
general overview of this industry in the country and explores whether the concerns 
raised; such as a lack of transparency and disclosure are justified, as well as possible 
solutions to these issues.  
The study does not seek to address the regulation of the private equity industry 
as a whole, but rather the regulation of the private equity investment fund and 
investor protection. Addressing the regulation of the industry as a whole would 
require an examination of Exchange Control and Income Tax regulations, among 
other issues, that is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the study focuses on the 
regulation of the private equity investment fund and promoting transparency and 
disclosure to investors.  
In sum, this study examines how the industry and investors in funds can 
improve investor protection and the governance structures of the funds in which they 
invest. The approaches adopted in the jurisdictions of the UK and the USA are 
considered and discussed. These are leading global economies. Furthermore, in light 
of the global financial crisis (GFC), the measures they adopted are pertinent to this 
study.  
There are various approaches to the regulation of funds. An examination of the 
regulation of this industry in the USA and UK shows that regulators have either 
adopted mandatory legislation, which is characterised as a meek regulatory approach, 
or the onerous maximalist approach. The industry has also applied voluntary 
                                                          
17 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2001 Annual Report to Shareholders ‘Warren E. Buffet: Letter to the 
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’ available at 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2001ar/2001ar.pdf , accessed 10 January 2015. 
18 Black op cit (n10) 2. 
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regulations which are overseen by industry associations. 19  These approaches are 
discussed as well as the implementation and evaluation of possible solutions, in the 
form of structural private monitoring solutions, and the co-regulatory approach.  
In regulating the private equity industry, it is vital that South Africa not simply 
follow other jurisdictions and cross the proverbial Rubicon.20 Simply following other 
jurisdictions is to cross the Rubicon which runs between, on the one hand, regulating 
funds appropriately and on the other, inappropriately regulating funds. The 
inappropriate regulation of funds may deter investors and negatively impact 
economic growth. There are other options. A balance needs to be maintained 
between a fund manager’s ability to engage with the market, achieve investment 
objectives, and adequately disclosure the pursuit of such objectives. To quote Wilbur 
Ross, ‘Banking and investments are the most heavily regulated industry in the world. 
Regulations don't solve things. Supervision solves things.’21 
The predicament the private equity industry faces includes identifying 
appropriate solutions to promote transparency and disclosure and decrease the risk 
level without affecting the flexibility of an industry that has thrived on limited 
intrusion in contractual relations.22 It is submitted that during the era when private 
equity prospered, contractual relations were sufficient to address the issues among 
the parties.23 However, legislators will intervene when malfeasance emerges and the 
economy is affected.  
This study assesses whether the South African legal environment should follow 
other jurisdictions which have called for the regulation of funds, or whether the 
current milieu in which private equity operates should be maintained, with minor 
adjustments to allay prevailing concerns. 
 
                                                          
19 Douglas Cumming The Oxford Handbook of Private Equity (2012) 156.  
20 The idiom ‘Crossing the Rubicon’ (Aleata Iacta Est – The Die is Cast) means to pass a point of no 
return and refers to Julius Caesar's army crossing of the Rubicon River in 49 BC. 
21 ‘The Financial Crisis: The Frontline Interviews’, Frontline, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/oral-history/financial-crisis/tags/regulatory-failures/ 
accessed on 16 November 2014. 
22 Black op cit (n10) 2. 
23 Payne op cit (n12) 1.  
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1.3 The Structure of the Dissertation 
Chapter two presents an overview of the private equity industry. It discusses the 
background of private equity, distinguishing it from other funds, as well as 
identifying the issues confronting this industry. These include governance challenges 
in the context of corporate governance, focusing on the distinctions between 
companies and partnerships and trusts.  
Chapter three assesses and discusses the regulation of funds in South Africa. 
The fund manager’s role as the agent of the fund and the consequence of governance 
failures are discussed. The need for regulation is assessed and certain regulatory 
developments are highlighted.  
Recent regulatory responses in the UK and USA are considered and assessed in 
Chapter four and their success and applicability in the South African setting are 
examined.  
Chapter five examines the adequacy of voluntary self-regulation and financial 
regulation to address the concerns raised in relation to funds.  Private actors’ 
effectiveness in ensuring the effective function of private equity is examined.  
Chapter six focuses on possible solutions to the issues relating to the regulation 
of funds, which include side letters and the establishment of an advisory committee 
as well as the co-regulatory approach to address governance challenges.  
South Africa’s legal framework encompasses a wide range of laws, regulations, 
administrative rules, and self-disciplinary guidelines. Globally, investors have 
recognised that one of the risks of investing in funds in South Africa is the possibility 
of the authorities changing their rules, or the manner in which they are applied.24 
Such concerns were amplified when the Minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene recently 
exercised his authority under the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act25 
(CISCA) to pronounce hedge funds collective investment schemes from 1 April 2015 
(Government Notice 141 of 2015).26   Sensitivity to changes in government policy in 
South Africa is critical to investors. Private equity rules and regulations could be an 
                                                          
24 SAVCA Three Decades op cit (n11) 22. 
25 No. 45 of 2002. 
26 National Treasury on Regulation of Hedge Funds in South Africa 2015, available at 
http://www.gov.za/speeches/regulation-hedge-funds-south-africa-2015-6-mar-2015-0000, accessed on 
15 March 2015. 
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impediment to the growth and the development of this industry. This study therefore 
examines possible solutions, taking into account South Africa’s unique context, as 
well as the practical implementation of such solutions. 























2. THE NATURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
2.1 Introduction 
Private equity is the least understood of the asset classes.27 This has serious 
consequences such as the overregulation or inappropriate regulation of the industry.  
Misconceptions are rife, such as the description of private equity as a ‘locust’ or 
‘vulture’, especially with regard to its place in our legal system and whether it ought 
to be regulated. 28 This chapter presents an overview of private equity, the manner in 
which funds undertake investments, and concerns relating to this industry. 
2.2 Private Equity Defined 
Private equity is an asset class which consists of debt and equity capital in operating 
companies that are not publically traded on the stock exchange. 29  Private equity 
consists of investors and funds that directly invest in private companies or conduct 
buyouts of public companies that delist from an exchange.30 In the UK and in Africa, 
the term ‘venture capital’ and ‘private equity’ are used interchangeably. In the USA, 
‘venture capital’ refers to investment in early stage and expanding companies. 31 To 
avoid any misunderstanding, the term private equity is used as a broad term that 
encompasses all types of private equity investment in private and public companies. 
Each type corresponds to specific profiles of companies and uses different financial 
structures.  
Private equity has existed since the beginning of commercial activity.32 
Centuries ago, Phoenician merchants and European traders paid a fifth of their 
proceeds to their ship captains in return for making dangerous voyages to ‘The New 
World and the Far East’, setting the model for the structure used in private equity 
throughout the world today.33  
                                                          
27 D Cumming Private Equity Fund Types Risks and Returns and Regulation (2010) at 437. 
28 The Economist ‘Private equity in Germany: Friendly locusts-A swarm of foreign investors visits the 
Finanzplatz’ The Economist 23 February 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/node/5557472, 
accessed on 27 December 2014. 
29 Steven Kaplan & Per Strömberg ‘Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity’ (2009) 23 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 121.  
30 Cumming op cit (n14) 3.  
31 Cumming op cit (n14) 1. 




It can be argued that the first private equity asset management in South Africa 
was the Dutch East India Company, established at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 
and funded by investors in Holland.  
Today, investors pay fund managers in return for ‘dangerous voyages’ into the 
private equity market.34 Private equity has grown and become a large scale 
industry.35 Venture capital firms were formed after World War 11, including 3i in the 
UK; and J.H. Whitney and Company and American Research and Development in 
the USA.36 These firms are still in existence.  
2.3 The Supply of Capital and Institutional Investors 
A variety of different investors supply capital to the private equity fund.37 On the 
supply side the fund 38 is a ‘vehicle’ formed to pool the funds of different investors, 
such as university endowments (e.g., the University of South Africa, and the 
University of Cape Town), pension funds (e.g., the Government Employees Pension 
Fund), insurance companies (e.g., Sanlam), and wealthy individuals (e.g., Mark 
Shuttleworth and Mitt Romney). This is not a closed list.  
The capital is invested in a range of different assets by professional fund 
managers. 39 Institutional investors participate in these pool investment vehicles in 
order to spread risk and provide investors with access to markets with capital growth 
potential. The investment patterns of institutional investors fit the private equity 
business model and its long term approach.40 Institutional investors have begun to 
assign greater percentages of their funds to private equities.41 The industry has 
                                                          
34 Supra 32.  
35 Robert J Samuelson ‘The Private Equity Boom’ The Washington Post 15 March 2007, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/14/AR2007031402177.html 
accessed on 11 January 2015. 
36 F Barber, & M Goold ‘The Strategic Secret of Private Equity’ (2007) Harvard Business Review 53.   
37 Richard Brealey et al Principles of Corporate Finance 10 ed (2011) 4.  
38 Harry Cendrowski et al Private Equity: History, Governance and operations (2008) 29. 
39 Bob Zider ‘How Venture Capital Works’ (1998) Harvard Business Review 131. 
40 M Wright ‘The Economic Impact of Private Equity: What we know and What we would like to 
know’ (2009) 11 Venture Capital  at 1-21. 
41 SAVCA/ KPMG Private Equity Industry Survey covering the 2013 calendar year. June 2014. 
Available at: http://www.savca.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/KPMG-SAVCA-Private-Equity-
Industry-Survey-2015-final-upload.pdf Accessed on: June 2015. 
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developed skills42 and confidence has grown in this asset class because private 
equities include asset classes that have the potential for high revenue.43 
2.4 Types of Investment Strategies 
Private equity funds subscribe to two types of investment strategies, venture capital 
and buyout funds.44  
Venture capital funds have become a source of funding for high growth 
industries in the expansion and start-up phase.45 Buyout funds buy a corporation 
from a seller; this is referred to as an institutional buy out. 46 If the target 
corporation’s resources are used as security to raise additional debt to finance the 
purchase, this is referred to as a leveraged buyout.  Private equity funds may also 
acquire the company listed shares on the Securities Exchange; this is known as a 
public-to-private buyout.47  
The objective of these private equity investments is to seek maximum capital 
value at some exit point. Unlike in the public listed environment, private equity has a 
complex risk profile, due to the fact that it is ‘exit driven’.48 ‘Exit driven’ in this 
sense means that funds seek to sell their interests as soon as they acquire control of 
an asset and are able to make a profit. Due to this high risk profile, effective investor 






                                                          
42 Steven N Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar ‘Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and 
Capital flows’ (2005) 60 Journal of Finance  1791. 
43 L Delevingne ‘Private Investors Pile into Africa’ Consumer News and Business Channel 17 March 
2015,   available at http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/17/private-equity-investors-pile-into-africa.html 
accessed on 21 March 2015. 
44 Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan  Venture Capital and Private Equity Contracting: an 
International Perspective (2009) 51.  
45 Cumming op cit (n19) 10. 
46M Wright, S Thompson & K Robbie ‘Venture Capital and Management-led Buyouts: A European 
Perspective’ (1992) 7 Journal of Business Venturing. 
47 Ibid. 





2.5 Implementation Models 
The diagram below illustrates the implementation models of an institutional investor. 
 
 










Private Equity Investment Structures Model49 
There are three main implementation models of an investor: 
1) Into private companies directly, sourced from the investor’s process and own 
network, or through funds;50 
2) Advisors and Fund-of-Funds choose funds for the investor and manage the 
investment; and 
3) Funds, managed by asset management firms committed to determining, 
investing, handling and realising company investments.51 
2.6 Private Equity Investment Fund Vehicles 
The form of the fund ‘vehicle’ is driven by two factors: tax transparency, and the 
limited liability of the investors. 52 A vehicle in the form of a company satisfies the 
latter but not the former requirement. 53 
                                                          
49 Cumming op cit (n27) 14. 
50 Nielsen Meisner ‘Institutional Investors and Private Equity’ (2008) 12 Review of Finance 185. 
51 Cumming op cit (n27) 9. 
52 James Spindler, ‘How Private is Private Equity and at What Cost?’ (2009) 76 University of Chicago 








Fund of Funds 
Fund A Fund B 





In South Africa, two vehicles are typically employed: limited partnerships (en 
commandite); and bewind trusts.54 The governance mechanisms relied on by 
investors includes the internal arrangements of the vehicle, and the common law. In 
contrast with other jurisdictions, no specific legislation applies to these ‘vehicles’ in 
South Africa.  These ‘vehicles’ are discussed further in Chapter three. 
Limited partnerships, limited liability companies and the offshore company are 
frequently used in the UK as private investment vehicles.55 Each investment fund is 
structured to address the unique characteristics of the investment vehicle. These 
include the regulatory position of the asset fund manager, and the tax treatment of the 
participants and the investments.56 Private equity funds’ governance structures stem 
from the choice of the legal vehicle, as well as the nature, demographics, and the 
number of the participants in the fund.57 Although other investment vehicles exist, 
limited partnerships have become the investment vehicles of choice in the UK for 
reasons which include tax, and regulatory deficiencies.58 However, following the 
European Union Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) and its 
regulations, an analysis of the regulations is necessary to ensure that a tax efficient 
vehicle does not inadvertently lead to issues relating to marketing and regulatory 
permission.59  
Funds in the USA are commonly structured as limited partnerships (LP) or 
limited liability companies (LLC). 60  Both are usually under the Delaware law. 
Funds can also be established outside the USA, such as in the Cayman Islands, to 
achieve tax efficiency for non-US or tax exempt investors.61    
These investment ‘vehicles’ are discussed further in Chapter four. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
53 G Fraser- Sampson Private Equity as an Asset Class (2007); Eli Talmor & Florin Vasvari 
International Private Equity (2011) 11; Geoff Yates & Mike Hinchliffe A Practical Guide to Private 
Equity Transactions (2010) 1. 
54 SAVCA Three Decades op cit (n11). 
55 Kay Muller ‘Investing in Private Partnerships: The Role of Monitoring and Reporting’ (2007) 
Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies 11.   
56 Dickson op cit (n1) 466. 
57 Timothy Spangler ‘Overcoming the Governance Challenge in Private Investment Funds through the 
Enrolment of Private Monitoring Solutions’(2009) London School of Economics  at 27. 
58 Ibid at 28. 
59 Timothy Spangler The Law of Private Investment Funds 2 ed (2012) at 196.  
60 A Schneeman. The Law of Corporations 5 ed (2010) at 52 – 113. 
61 Dickson op cit (n1) 506.  
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2.7 Internal Arrangements 
The internal arrangements of the fund are regulated by the trust deed where a bewind 
trust is used as the investment vehicle, and contract, 62 where the investment vehicle 
is a LP or a Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association where an LLC 
or an offshore company is used.63 The agreement between the institutional investors 
and the asset management firm (private equity firm) includes contractual terms that 
define the guidelines governing the running of the fund.64 Terms and conditions 
include:65 
1. Limitations on investment choices, which include the length of the 
investment, and equity investment; 66 
2. Limitations on financial arrangements, such as leverage, and reinvestment 
of capital after it is realised; 
3. The investment mandate; 67  
4. Financial accounting; and68  
5. Investor protection and rights, which include the ability to remove the 
fund manager; accounting, reporting and valuations requirements; and 
investor representation on advisory committee. 
Contractual terms and covenants have been presented as an ideal structure to 
alleviate principal-agent conflicts in the investment model of private equity.69   In 
practice however, it is possible that they actually increase conflicts of interest, thus 
calling for more effective regulation.70 
                                                          
62 Daniel Schmidt & Mark Wahrenburg ‘Contractual relations between European VC funds and 
investors: The impact of bargaining power and reputation on contractual design’ (2003) CFS Working 
Paper No. 2003/15, 2003 at 1. 
63 Yates & Hinchcliffe op cit (n53) 47. 
64 Paul A Gompers & Josh Lerner ‘The use of covenants: An empirical analysis of venture capital 
partnership agreements’ (1996) Journal of Law and Economics 463; Metrick op cit (n16) 2303. 
65 Kate Litvak ‘Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding compensation 
arrangements’ (2009 University of Chicago Law Review at 161-218. 
66 Cumming op cit (n27) 15. 
67 Gompers & Lerner op cit (n64) 2303. 
68 Cumming & Johan  op cit (n44) 51. 
69 Gompers & Lerner op cit (n64) 463. 
70 Cumming and Johan op cit (n44) 27.  
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2.8 Fund Manager as the Financial Intermediary 
While reducing but not eradicating the information asymmetries and agency costs 
associated with the portfolio company, the fund manager’s position as the financial 
intermediary creates informational asymmetries and agency costs in funds.71 
Informational asymmetry refers to circumstances where relevant information is 
not known to all parties involved.72 Participants do not have access to the 
information required for sound decision-making.73 Agency costs refer to conflicts 
between the principal (investor) and their agent (fund manager), which emerge from 
the separation of ownership and control.74 One of the solutions for informational 
asymmetries and agency costs is disclosure of performance and transparency from 
the portfolio company, to the private equity firm, and from the private equity firm to 
the investor.75 The diagram below illustrates the fund manager as the financial 








Information/Investment flows in a Private Equity Setting76 
While the disclosure from the portfolio company to the private equity firm is 
made in compliance with company law, the performance disclosure to the investor is 
hampered by two complications. On the one hand, valuation requires sufficient 
information on the performance of the fund, whereas on the other, even if such 
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information is obtainable, private equity firms choose to disclose information 
tactically.77 As noted, funds have unfettered freedom to run the fund, enabling the 
fund manager to exercise his/her judgement untouched by regulation.78 Inadequate 
transparency and disclosure obligations impose substantial constraints on the 
relationship between the fund and investors. 
2.9 Issues and Concerns 
(a) Investor Protection 
The concern regarding investor protection arises from the collectivised nature of 
investment funds.79 South African, UK and USA law provide for investor protection 
in different ways, 80  including criminal law provisions; substantive rights and 
obligations under civil law; voluntary systems of regulation; and statutory systems of 
regulation.81 Although statutory regulation exists, due to the nature of funds, it falls 
outside the oversight of the Financial Services Board (FSB) in South Africa.  
As a result of the ‘unregulated nature’ of the private equity fund, investor 
protection concerns are addressed at a late stage of negotiations after issues such as 
the economic arrangements between the parties and the investment objectives of the 
fund have been resolved.82 The question therefore is to what extent are the legal 
remedies outside the statutory regulation regime sufficient to address the 
‘governance challenge’.83 Participants rely on the governance mechanisms of the 
legal ‘vehicles’ used as funds, supplemented by any additional contractual 
agreements between the parties, for oversight of the fund manager.84 The investor 
protection provided by transparency and disclosure are regulated by the terms of the 
agreement.85 
                                                          
77 Cumming op cit (n19) 16. 
78 David Rosenberg ‘Venture Capital Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract’ (2002) 
363 Colum Bus L Rev 398.  
79 A Fung et al Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency  (2007) 14. 
80 Spangler  op cit (n59) 1. 
81 Robert Clark ‘The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries’ (1976) 86 Yale Law Journal 26. 
82 Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz ‘Private Equity Returns and Disclosure around the World’ (2004) 
Journal of International Business Studies  727. 
83 Spangler op cit (n59) 20. 
84 Cumming op cit (n27) 375.  
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16 
 
Hedge funds, 86 as opposed to private equity funds (funds) in South Africa are 
now regulated by the CISCA.87 Hedge funds are short-term investors, which pursue 
profit from short-term speculative investments.88 This study focuses on private equity 
funds, where the only investor protection provided is at the level of the private equity 
firm.89  
Evidence shows that the level of investor protection has important economic 
consequences for the market.90 La Porter et al assert that the higher the investor 
protection provided, the more developed the financial markets and the greater the 
economy’s growth.91 The problem this study addresses is how to improve investor 
protection and governance structures in funds by providing adequate transparency 
and disclosure.92 Niamh Moloney notes the appeal of ‘investor protection’,93 which 
has been the dominant regulatory objective in developed and emerging markets. 
However, the question remains as to whether the regulators are justified in 
intervening.   
Investor protection is necessary where there has been a market failure, 
primarily related to information asymmetries and agency costs.94 Investor risks stem 
from incentive misalignment in the principal/agent relationship which characterises 
the investor/intermediary relationship in private equity.95 As noted, investors have 
insufficient ability to negotiate for protection in agreements and to evaluate financial 
intermediaries. There is thus a need to address information asymmetries. This also 
calls for the protection of the individual’s independence and promotes minimal 
intervention by regulators. Moloney also notes that paternalism is associated with 
investor protection.  
                                                          
86 Steen Thomsen  ‘Should Private Equity be Regulated?’ (2015) 10 European Business Organization 
Law Review Cambridge University Press 97. 
87 The National Treasury on Regulation of Hedge Funds op cit (n26). 
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Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7428; Rafael La Porta et al ‘Investor Protection 
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‘[p]aternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, 
against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered 
with will be better off or protected from harm. It is less concerned with information 
and more associated with intervention for the individual’s [investor] own good. ’96 
Benjamin states that this more defensive approach to investor protection leads to 
heavier interference in the investor/investment firm relationship, and in the delivery 
and design of investment products. 97 Private equity returns are influenced by strong 
investor protection laws in a jurisdiction, providing investors with the capability to 
contract with certainty.98 Due to the structure of funds, disclosure of information 
offers benefits to investors in regulating dubious activities by fund managers. 99  
(b) Overregulation or Inappropriate Regulation of the Industry 
The key concern is to promote the fund’s transparency and disclosure to the 
investors, without imposing onerous obligations on the fund managers and the 
private equity industry. Overregulation or inappropriate regulation of the industry 
would be detrimental to its continued growth.100 Therefore, adequate investor 
protection in the form of transparency and disclosure is required without crossing the 
proverbial Rubicon. A balance is needed. The question is, considering the current 
milieu in which private equity is conducted, does the industry have the regulatory 
balance between promoting growth and investor protection?  
The following chapters examine how the industry and investors in funds can 
improve transparency and disclosure and the governance structures of the funds in 
which they invest. The question of whether South Africa should follow other 
jurisdictions which have called for the regulation of funds is addressed. An 
alternative approach, that is, whether the country should maintain the current milieu 
in which private equity operates, with minor changes to allay current concerns, is 
also examined. The following chapter discusses and analyses the regulation of 
private equity funds in South Africa. 
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3. THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction  
The global community regards South Africa as a profitable market for private equity 
investments.101 The 2015 KPMG and South African Venture Capital and Private 
Equity Association Industry Performance Survey for 2014 notes that a substantial 
part of funds are obtained from within and outside South Africa.102 These private 
equity investors’ long term commitments contribute to Foreign Direct Investment in 
South Africa and the rest of Africa.103 The survey highlights the role of private equity 
in Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BB-BEE).104 Private equity 
investments facilitate BB-BEE shareholdings, and many transactions have a BB-BEE 
element to their structuring.105 The survey noted a substantial increase in private 
equity investments in 2014, with a growth in the number of deals, overall value and 
the average size of the deal.106   
As a profitable asset class, the private equity industry is an important sector 
within the financial services industry.107 Thus, as a contributor to the South African 
economy,108 regulation of this industry should not inhibit private equity investment.  
South Africa has a sophisticated private equity industry, with different funds at 
all stages,109 although it is small in comparison with those of the UK and the USA.110  
International forces have shaped the South African private equity industry.111 
Whilst the country’s private equity industry emerged from the GFC of 2007-2008 in 
                                                          
101 World Bank Group. Doing Business in South Africa, available at: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/south-africa, accessed on 10 March 2015.  
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110 SAVCA/KPMG Survey op cit (n41) 28. 
111 Steven N Kaplan ‘The Future of Private Equity’ 21 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (2009) 
8; Cumming op cit (n27) 419. 
19 
 
better shape than other jurisdictions,112 the crisis accelerated financial regulation of 
this industry and reduced interest in private equity.113  Regulation is partly the result 
of misunderstanding private equity as an asset class. Nonetheless, the private equity 
industry in South Africa has continued to grow.114 The reasons are diverse and are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. This would be a useful topic for further 
research. In short however, the growth of South African private equity investments 
resulted from substantial institutional support and the commitment of funds to this 
sector. BB-BEE legislation,115 as well as pension fund legislation,116 provided the 
institutional support for private equity and the allocation of funds to private equity 
investments. 117  
The Companies Act sets out requirements that seek to promote the 
transparency and disclosure of the portfolio company and the private equity private 
equity firm to the regulator.118 The establishment of private equity firms in South 
Africa is governed by the new Companies Act.119 For example, as part of the 
Fidentia Group, Fidentia Asset Management (Pty) Ltd had to comply with the 
regulations of the Companies Act with regard to transparency and disclosure.120 It 
also had to adhere to the regulations of the FAIS Act in order to operate as a 
Financial Services Provider (FSP).121However, funds that are managed by asset 
managers offer transparency and disclosure to different degrees, depending on the 
form of the ‘vehicle’ used by private equity investors, the common law, and 
contractual arrangements. 122  Therefore, investor protection can be limited.  
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3.2 Forms of Private Equity Funds in South Africa 
The ‘vehicle’ often used by private equity firms in South Africa is the en 
commandite partnership (ECP), or a bewind trust. Private equity firms use the ECP or 
the bewind trust for two reasons:123 tax issues, and transparency and disclosure 
obligations. While the Companies Act contains provisions on transparency and 
disclosure, funds are subject to the common law and the agreement between the fund 
manager and investors. 
(a) Limited Liability Partnership 
The most common investment vehicle is the limited liability partnership.124 In South 
Africa it is known as the ECP, a type of common law partnership.125 Similar to the 
limited partnerships found in other jurisdictions,126 the ECP does not have a separate 
legal personality. It has two categories of partners: partners with limited liability 
which is usually a private equity fund's investors or limited partners; and partners 
with unlimited liability as regards third parties known as the general partner which is 
the fund manager. A general partner (GP) is responsible for overall transactions; the 
GP has unlimited liability and has a number of en commandite or limited partners.  
The identity of the en commandite partner is not disclosed and they thus carry limited 
liability restricted to their capital contribution amount.127 The diagram below 
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The Limited Partnership (ECP) 
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The LP contributes a fixed amount on condition that the investor receives a 
certain share of the profit, if any. In the event of a loss, the investor is liable to their 
co-partners to the extent of the fixed amount of agreed capital contribution only.129  
An ECP is established by contract,130 and its internal nature or functioning is 
regulated by such.131 The contract between the parties reflects the intention to 
establish an ECP and identifies the general or disclosed partner.132 There are no 
registration requirements for establishing the ECP, and no legislation regulates such 
partnerships.133 Instead, they are governed by the common law.134 Together with 
contractual obligations, the GP owes fiduciary duties to the partnership as they stand 
in a fiduciary relationship.135  
The partners have wide discretion to arrange their affairs in the partnership in 
accordance with their commercial intentions, provided that the partnership adheres to 
the requirements of an ECP and subject to the general requirements for enforceable 
contracts. This includes the requirement that the terms of the agreement should be 
sufficiently certain and lawful.136  The terms of the partnership agreement are not 
publicly available. Transparency and disclosure requirements are contained in the 
contract, and in most instances, fund managers do not set out such terms in the 
agreement.  
The fact that the identities of the LPs are not disclosed has a number of 
effects.137 They are not presented as partners and accordingly, individuals dealing 
with the partnership do not form that mistaken impression. The LP is only liable to 
their co-partners and not for partnership debts to creditors. They therefore enjoy the 
benefits of limited liability.138  The LP may not participate in the partnership 
business although the LP is entitled to advise the managing partner and may also 
enjoy limited consent rights. They also cannot claim reimbursement of their 
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130 Ibid at 4. 
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137 Williams op cit (n126) 41. 
138 S Butcher & Sons v Baranov Bros (1905) 26 NLR 589; Eaton & Louw v Arcade Properties (Pty) 
Ltd 1961 4 SA 233 (T). 
22 
 
contributions or payment of their share of the partnership profits in competition with 
the partnership’s creditors.139  
The GP of the ECP has unlimited liability to the partnership’s creditors in 
circumstances where the partnership’s resources are not sufficient to settle debts.140  
The ECP is usually terminated upon agreement between all the partners or in 
accordance with the partnership agreement, which may, for example, provide that the 
GP may terminate the partnership on notice to the other partners.141  
The principles for ensuring that an LP’s liability remains limited are simple. 
Unfortunately, South Africa has no list of acceptable LP activities. Therefore most 
investors adopt a conformist approach to fund involvement.142  If LPs participate in 
the partnership business, they will lose their limited liability status.143  
The question of disclosure of the identity of LPs, and specifically, the effect of 
such disclosure on the liability of the partners in an ECP is not clear.  Early case law 
and textbook writers seem to feel that it is important that the identity of LPs is not 
disclosed to third parties.144 However, Mmabatho Food Corporation (Pty) Ltd v 
Fourie en Andere145 is the authority for the proposition that the non-disclosure of LPs 
is not the issue. The key issue is that an LP enjoys protection against the claims of 
the partnership’s creditors to the extent that he/she has not created, or permitted to be 
created, a mistaken impression on the part of outsiders that they can rely on his/her 
credit as an ordinary partner in the partnership.146  If LPs participate in decisions on 
the partnership’s investment, they will be partaking in the business of the partnership 
and may thus lose their limited liability status.  
There are two ways to avoid this. The LP may sit on an advisory committee to 
the partnership. In this way the LP does not participate actively in 
investment/divestment decisions, and does not take part in the everyday management 
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of the partnership. 147 The LP may also sit on the advisory committee of the 
investment firm and make recommendations to the fund. The use of advisory 
committees is, however, limited in South Africa. This issue is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
(b) Bewind Trusts 
The bewind trust is another structure that is used to establish a fund. Bewind trusts 
have become very popular in South Africa as private equity investment vehicles.  







Beneficiaries                                                                                 Trustee 
(Investors in the Fund)                                                    (Fund Manager) 
Bewind Trust Structure 
It is established by way of a written trust deed.149 This applies to all trusts. A 
bewind trust differs from other forms of trusts under South African law like the 
ordinary trust.150 In a normal trust, the beneficiaries do not own the assets of the 
trust; the trustee holds and administers these assets.151  In the bewind trust, 152  the 
trustees do not own, but merely administer the assets of the trust that are owned in 
undivided shares by the beneficiaries of the trust. 153 The trust assets does not form 
part of the trustee estate,154 except insofar as the trustee is a beneficiary. 155 As noted 
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above, the trust deed may not provide for transparency and the disclosure of the fund 
arrangements to the other beneficiaries of the bewind trust.  
Similar to partnerships, apart from the particular issues which are subject to the 
statutes dealing with inter alia, insolvency, licensing and criminal proceedings and 
the rules of court regulating civil litigation, bewind trusts in South Africa are 
governed by the common law. The fund manager as trustee owes the trust the 
fiduciary duties of care and skill, and the avoidance of conflicts of interest, among 
others.156 Along with the fiduciary duties, the contract attempts to address any issues 
and concerns. 
(c) The Structure of a Private Equity Investment 
An institutional investor’s ability to assess and monitor the investment fund 
manager’s decision-making process is very important to the investor. With regard to 
funds, the investor/fund manager relationship is complicated due to the imposition of 
the intermediary investment vehicle. Consequently, the monitoring of the investment 
fund manager is intertwined with the governance mechanisms of the investment 
fund. 157 The fiduciary duties and contractual agreements entered into attempt to deal 
with any issues and concerns.  
The fund manager’s contractual role informs the range of fiduciary duties owed 
by the fund manager to the investment fund. 158. The legal duties owed by a fund 
manager to an investor in a fund are set out in the investment agreement entered into 
as part of the establishment of the fund and the investment vehicle. 159    
As noted, while the private equity firm is a company, and therefore regulated by the 
Companies Act and the FAIS Act as an FSP, funds structured as an ECP or a bewind 
trust are not subject to regulations and there is no government body that applies 
regulatory oversight. It is questioned whether reliance on the common law and 
contractual agreements will provide sufficient protection.   
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(i) Fiduciary duties 
There is trust involved in the relationship between a fund manager and the investor; 
this means that the fund manager will be deemed to be the investor’s fiduciary.160 
This results in a duty of loyalty.161 In addition to claims of negligence and breach of 
contract, such duty could be the basis for a claim by the investor. A definition of the 
fiduciary relationship which is appropriate in the private equity investment funds 
setting is provided by the Law Commission: 
‘[b]roadly speaking a fiduciary relationship is one in which a person undertakes to act 
on behalf of another, often as an intermediary with a discretionary power that affects 
the interests of the other who depends on the fiduciary for information and advice.’162  
The effectiveness of fiduciary duties can be limited by contractual means. 
Contractual approaches include using agreements to modify the fiduciary duties. This 
is done either by means of exclusion clauses or disclosure and consent. The terms of 
the contract therefore play an important role in defining the fiduciary relationship.  
The fiduciary duties of the fund manager to the fund and the investors are an 
effective means of recourse for clients in ensuring that the investment manager offers 
professional services in compliance with recognised standards.163 The common law 
fiduciary duties of the fund manager differ from the provisions of the Companies 
Act, in that the duties are owed directly to the investors, as the fund manager stands 
in a fiduciary position to the investors. However the effectiveness of the fiduciary 
duties varies depending on the contractual agreements. 
(ii) Contracts 
With regard to the organisation of the fund, in the South African context, the 
investment vehicle housing the fund would typically appoint the fund manager or 
adviser in terms of a written mandate to manage the everyday affairs of the fund and 
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to identify and execute investments and disinvestments.164 Funds involve many 
contractual arrangements between the fund vehicle and the fund manager. Where the 
fund vehicle is a limited partnership or a bewind trust, the limited partnership 
agreement or trust deed will also be a contract negotiated between the parties. A 
frequent claim against a fund manager is for breach of an implied or express term in 
the investment management agreement. The fund manager often faces liability in 
both contract as well as breach of a fiduciary duty.165 
Although practice varies, the fund manager or adviser would not always have 
direct contractual obligations to specific investors, save if created by way of a side 
letter and would in many cases only owe contractual obligations to the bewind trust 
or partnership housing the fund.166 A side letter or side agreement is a collective 
agreement that is not part of the primary agreement which the parties to the contract 
use to reach agreement on issues not covered by the agreement. It is applied to 
clarify issues in the agreement, or to modify the agreement permanently or 
temporarily.167 Side letters are regarded as an effective tool to regulate the internal 
nature of agreements in private equity, and the industry has seen an increase in their 
use.168 Side letters are discussed further in chapter six.  
Although it is standard practice for the attorneys advising on the establishment 
of the fund to issue an opinion confirming that the applicable agreements have been 
duly authorised and are lawful, valid and enforceable, such opinion is often given to 
the fund rather than to investors.169 This could adversely impact transparency and 
disclosure. 
The matters typically addressed in the applicable trust deed or partnership 
agreement have become standardised. Investors in a South African fund could expect 
contractual provisions dealing with a number of terms.170  
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Due to the standardised nature of the contractual provisions, terms with regard 
to transparency and disclosure to the investors are not adequately given effect to.171 
This puts the funds of the investor at risk and could ultimately be to the detriment of 
investments. Without adequate disclosure to the investor, the investor may be unable 
to determine whether the funds are being applied as mandated. As a result of agency 
costs and information asymmetries, investors would only receive such information 
after the fact, after the tide has gone out, to quote Warren Buffet.172 Adequate 
disclosure and transparency to the investors may limit information asymmetries and 
agency costs, and ensure the fund is complying with the mandate and representing 
the true value to investors. 
As noted above, in contrast with private equity funds, hedge funds are now 
regulated in terms of the CISCA.173 The amendments to the CISCA are likely to lead 
to improved investor confidence and have the potential to enhance growth in the 
industry. While the transparency and disclosure requirements are commendable, it is 
submitted that South Africa should avoid crossing the Rubicon, by overregulating or 
inappropriately regulating the private equity industry as this would deter investment. 
Financial regulations’ potential to address such issues and concerns is further 
discussed in Chapters six and seven. 
Given the concerns regarding non-disclosure and non-transparency and the 
need for investor protection, an overview of the South African regulatory framework 
and the main regulatory bodies is presented. This chapter also discusses the specific 
rules governing a private equity investment. Furthermore, the discussion will 
consider the impact of overregulation and inappropriate regulation of the industry. 
3.3 The General Regulatory Framework 
The general private equity regulatory framework in South Africa consists of relevant 
legislation, the formal bodies and industry associations. 
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While a fund is not required to register with a government agency, fund 
managers are required to register as financial services providers (FSP) under the 
FAIS Act.174  
The provision of financial intermediary services or advice to investors in South 
Africa is subject to regulations in terms of the FAIS Act. The licences issued in terms 
of the Act include: 
a) category I licences which are assigned to FSPs providing non‐discretionary 
intermediary advice or services; 
b) category II licences assigned to FSPs who provide discretionary fund 
management; 
c) category IIA licences assigned to FSPs who manage funds on a discretionary 
basis; and 
d) category III licences assigned to administrative FSPs who aggregate client 
funds or securities. 
Such licence holders are bound by the principles and rules set out in the applicable 
codes of conduct established by the FSB. The FAIS Act regulates the provision of 
certain financial advisory and intermediary services to investors. It enforces a duty 
on FSPs to provide financial services fairly; reliably, with due care, diligence and 
skill, in investors’ interests and in a way that promotes the integrity of the financial 
services industry.175 The FAIS Act provides for detailed regulation of actual and 
possible conflicts of interest between financial intermediaries and advisers licensed 
under the Act. It includes the requirement that such persons must implement and 
adopt a conflict of interest management policy.176  
 The FAIS Act seeks to deal with transparency and disclosure by requiring 
information at the level of the fund manager.177 It does not provide such transparency 
and disclosure to investors in the private equity fund. An example is the private 
equity firm’s disclosure. A miscreant fund manager’s conduct only becomes apparent 
when the fund manager is called on to disclose information in compliance with the 
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Act. Even then, such disclosure occurs long after the investor’s funds are used.  It is 
also noted, that the delictual and contractual liability of the asset manager is 
contingent on the emergence of fraud or misrepresentation by the fund manager. This 
liability is based on the common law and the FAIS Act. The transparency and 
disclosure of the fund manager occurs after the fact; on-going transparency to 
investors would limit miscreant conduct.  
The regulatory bodies include both formal and voluntary industry associations. 
These are the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Ombud, the FSB, and 
the SAVCA. 
The Office of the Ombud for Financial Services Providers (‘FAIS Ombud’) 
was established by the FAIS Act.178 The role of the FAIS Ombud is to resolve 
disputes between FSPs and their investors.   
The FAIS Ombud deals with various determinations under its authority. It has 
the authority to deal with violations of the Act by fund managers. Fund managers 
who fail to comply with transparency and disclosure to the regulator are dealt with 
by the Ombud. Complaints by the public of a lack of compliance with the fund 
manager’s investment mandate, such as non-disclosure, are also dealt with by the 
Ombud.  However, the Ombud is limited in addressing issues and concerns. 
The main body responsible for administering applicable legislation is the FSB 
which is established as a statutory body by the Financial Services Board Act (FSB 
Act).179 It controls the undertakings of non-banking financial services 180 and acts in a 
consultative capacity to the Finance Minister.181  
The Executive Officer (EO) of the FSB has wide powers, which include the 
cancellation of authorisation to provide financial services. The EO has official 
authority to undertake investigation with criminal sanctions. It can apply to court for 
a mandamus, interdict or curatorship where required. The regulatory powers of the 
EO take effect where the authorised FSP conduct appears to have been in breach of 
the law, or if it is unsure if the FSP is fit and proper to provide services.  
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As noted above, private equity firms are also subject to regulations imposed by 
voluntary self-regulated associations if they are members.182 Private associations 
establish voluntary rules that private equity firms have to abide by if they wish to 
retain their membership.183 Private equity firms are encouraged to become members 
as this promotes access to investors.  
The SAVCA is a self-regulatory association that many private equity firms are 
members of.184 It describes itself as a voluntary private regulator and a representative 
of institutions that act in the capital and financial markets.185 As a regulator, the 
SAVCA plays different roles as ‘watchdog’, and ‘representative’ of the industry. 186  
It promotes transparency and disclosure, produces statistical surveys of capital 
markets, and educates the public on investment decisions.187   
It is submitted that investors need to be able to trust the funds in which they 
invest. This trust has been replaced with suspicion and mistrust with the uncovering 
of private equity wrongdoing.  The legislation as well as suggestions on corporate 
governance are being and have been amended to protect investors and prevent 
corporate malfeasance and failure. Formal bodies and industry associations such as 
FAIS Ombud, the FSB, and the SAVCA are attempting to deal with the issues and 
the concerns which have been raised. 
With regard to FAIS Board Determinations, the FAIS Ombud has jurisdiction 
to hear complaints.188 The FAIS Ombud deals with various determinations under its 
authority. 
Section 28 of the FAIS Act provides that where a matter has not yet been 
settled or a recommendation in Section 27 (5) such as conciliation is not accepted, 
the Ombud must make a final determination of the complaint. The FAIS Ombud has 
attempted to promote its objectives and ensure compliance with the Act by 
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permitting complaints to be brought, and providing determinations.189 In some 
instances the FAIS Ombud has referred the matter to the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) for further investigation where there has been criminal activity.190 
In the matter between Sunker v Shevgem Investments;191 and Blessie v Shevgem 
Investments;192 the Ombud for FSPs was called upon to make determinations in terms 
of Section 28 of the FAIS Act. The Ombud upheld both complaints that there had 
been inadequate compliance with the Act, and inadequate disclosure. In these 
matters, the asset manager failed to comply with the investment mandate by not 
providing disclosure and transparency to the investors. The authority of the Ombud 
is, however, limited in that its jurisdiction to hear matters is limited and even where 
the office has jurisdiction the return of the funds invested is not always guaranteed. 
The FSB is responsible for regulating market conduct and administering 
applicable legislation to ensure that the markets function efficiently. The EO has 
wide regulatory powers, and has applied these in order to protect financial markets. 
These include the termination of authorisation to provide financial services as well as 
investigative powers with criminal sanctions; the EO may apply to the court for 
various actions such as winding up institutions or placing them or curatorship, among 
others. The FSB has displayed its power in dealing with corporate scandals caused 
by a lack of adequate disclosure and transparency of a fund.193  
While the FSB’s ability to regulate market conduct is commendable, it is clear 
that it fails to adequately deal with all issues and concerns. Transparency and 
disclosure to the investor is limited, in that the fund manager has no direct 
obligations to investors, save if negotiated by contract. As seen in the Fidentia 
scandal, the ability and powers of the FSB are limited in that it does not deal with 
issues and concerns directly. In this scandal, investors suffered damage due to the 
conduct of the private equity firm. The firm acted contrary to its mandate, and due to 
inadequate disclosure and transparency, the malfeasance emerged at a late stage. The 
Tri-linear scandal revealed further weaknesses in the FSB’s ability to address such 
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concerns.  Even after being suspended as FSPs, the investment managers continued 
trading, resulting in further losses to investors. As the matter proceeds to trial it will 
reveal other weaknesses in the context of funds, and this may influence regulators’ 
approach to the private equity asset class. 
With regard to the SAVCA, its ability to deal with issues and concerns is also 
limited. While it promotes disclosure and the transparency of funds, because 
membership is voluntary, the voluntary regulations only extend to asset managers 
who are members. Those who are not members may simply avoid applying 
transparency and disclosure. Furthermore, the SAVCA Code is not legally binding. 
However, membership of the SAVCA influences the ability of the private equity firm 
to attract investors. This is clearly indicated by the Pension Funds Act,194 and it’s 
‘Conditions’ which promote membership of the SAVCA. Members of SAVCA are 
able to attract pension funds seeking to invest. In this manner this Act promotes 
compliance with the SAVCA. Another example is the Public Investment Corporation 
(PIC), which applies the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA). 
CRISA recognises the objects of the SAVCA; therefore, members of the SAVCA are 
able to attract PIC investors. 
The adequacy of financial regulation and voluntary self-regulation is discussed 
and assessed further in Chapter 5.  
3.4 Regulations which Support the Growth of the Industry 
With regard to the growth and regulation of private equity investments, the 
regulatory developments worth noting are the position with respect to pension fund 
investors, and the PIC.  
(a) Pension Funds 
In terms of the regulatory framework, the Registrar of Pension Funds issued 
conditions for investment in funds known as ‘The Conditions’ in March 2012.195 
‘The Conditions’ stipulate requirements in order for a fund to qualify for investment 
by a pension fund. Although the applicable requirements do not bind funds, pension 
funds are substantial investors and therefore funds have a strong incentive to comply 
with ‘The Conditions’.  
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The most significant requirements contained in ‘The Conditions’ are the 
following: 
1) the fund auditors must verify the assets of the fund on a biannual basis,196 and the 
fund must produce audited financial statements conforming with international 
financial reporting standards within 120 days of the end of its financial year;197  
2) fund managers must be members of the SAVCA,198  and are required to be 
authorised as discretionary FSPs under the FAIS Act, a category of licence that 
many fund managers did not hold before ‘The Conditions’ were published; 199 
3) the pension fund must consider a list of prescribed due diligence matters before 
investing in a private equity fund, including the fee structure of the fund and its 
risk and compliance policies and procedures;200 
4) permissible local private equity structures are limited to ECPs, bewind trusts and 
companies;201 and 
5) the fund must have policies and procedures to determine the value of the funds’ 
assets, in compliance with the International Private Equity Valuation 
Guidelines,202 and any valuations must be certified annually by a third party.203  
 
‘The Conditions’ have affected funds in that they have given legal binding 
effect to the SAVCA Code. Pension funds require that the contractual terms comply 
with the checklist of due diligence matters prescribed by the Registrar.204 ‘The 
Conditions’ seek to promote transparency and disclosure to pension fund 
investors.205 However, this does not apply to other investors such as insurance 
companies, wealthy individuals, and university endowments. 
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(b) Public Investment Corporation 
The PIC is regulated by the Public Investment Corporation Act No. 23 of 2004. 
Wholly-owned by the government of South African, the PIC is obliged to comply 
with the governance and financial management provisions of the South African 
Public Finance Management Act 29 of 2009.206 The PIC is a strategic supporter of 
the CRISA.207 CRISA promotes transparency and investors should consider a 
collective approach to promote acceptance and application of its codes and standards 
and other principles applicable to investors.208 Although these requirements are not 
binding on funds, the PIC is a significant investor and funds therefore have a strong 
incentive to comply with CRISA. In applying CRISA, the PIC promotes 
transparency of funds, which are likely to comply in order to attract investment.  
These regulatory developments are characterised as the co-regulatory 
approach, which combines contractual regulation, voluntary self-regulation, and 
financial regulation. The co-regulatory approach is discussed further in Chapters six 
and seven.   
3.5 Regulations Proposed to Deal with the Issues and Concerns Raised 
(a) Treating Customers Fairly 
The FSB is developing a Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) Policy Programme to 
regulate the market conduct of financial services firms.209 The programme aims to 
ensure that fair treatment of investors /customers is rooted within the firms’ culture. 
Although the programme has not yet been finalised, industry surveys shows 
that many investment firms are evaluating their practices against the applicable 
outcomes-based principles.210 The FSB’s visions for the TCF programme are that 
investors’ financial services requirements are met by a viable industry.211 This 
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embraces the transitional TCF outcomes which include enhanced transparency and 
discipline, appropriate products and services, and improved customer confidence.   
The private equity industry is relatively new in South Africa, and further 
understanding of how it operates is required. Due to the nature of financial services 
the concerns of prejudicial treatment surface much later. Increasing the risk of 
consumer exploitation, these issues are deepened by the poor level of financial 
knowledge among investors in South Africa.212  
As noted, the South African regulation of the financial sector includes 
numerous methods directed at protecting investors. 213  However, a harmonised 
investor protection regulatory framework applied across the sector that is tailor-made 
to address the explicit risks to the sector has been lacking. This is indicative in the 
scandals and miscreant behaviour on the part of fund managers witnessed in the 
private equity sector.214 It was against this background that the FSB published the 
TCF Discussion Document. The Document specified that TCF would be 
implemented as part of the regulatory framework and highlighted real examples of 
the prospective application of the TCF approach.215  
The FSB will make regulatory amendments to legislation, including the FAIS 
Act to implement the policy document, and apply the TCF policy.216 Although the 
FAIS Act has features of the TCF Policy in its regulations, including limited 
disclosure requirements, the Policy is anticipated to be more extensive.217  
(b) The National Treasury Policy Document 
The National Treasury published a policy document entitled ‘A Safer Financial 
Sector to Serve South Africa Better’ (NT Policy Document) on 23 February 2011.218 
Proposals to strengthen the regulation of this sector were set out in the Document.219  
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Market conduct and investor protection are the important policy priorities for 
financial sector regulation. They have been acknowledged in the NT Policy 
Document.220 It also notes the significance of market conduct in ensuring financially 
sound regulation. The Financial Sector Regulation Bill proposes a new market 
conduct regulator. 221  Market conduct wrongdoings contributed to systemic risks 
during the recent GFC.222 It was only ‘after the tide had gone out’ that the 
wrongdoings emerged.  
The TCF notes the South African movement towards a ‘twin peaks’ financial 
model of regulation given the importance of strengthening practical and market 
conduct regulation.223 One regulator, the South African Reserve Bank, 224 will have 
the duty of prudential regulation of the sector, and the FSB, 225  will have the duty of 
market conduct regulation.226 The ‘twin peaks’ model is a will mean tougher market 
conduct regulation at the FSB as opposed to the general ‘hands-off’ approach 
currently applied.227  
The NT Policy Document describes the TCF Programme as ‘an important step 
in strengthening market conduct objectives in the financial sector’.228 Therefore, the 
FSB has been given a clear directive by National Treasury to present the TCF 
programme as a significant tool to drive investor protection through strengthened 
market conduct regulation.229  
In terms of the current regulatory milieu, the FSB and the FAIS Ombud do 
provide safeguards, but they offer protection after the fact, after the prohibited 
conduct has been engaged in or has allegedly been engaged in. Continued 
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transparency and disclosure may provide the FSB with improved ability to perform 
its functions. Until such time as the TCF Programme is implemented, and the 
objectives of the NT Policy document are given effect, concerns remain regarding 
investor protection. However, the question remains whether the adoption of such 
regulations will result in the overregulation or inappropriate regulation of the 
industry, crossing the proverbial Rubicon. The effect of onerous regulations is 
discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6. 
(c) Private Equity Scandal’s Influence on the Proposed Regulations 
The proposed regulations contained in the FSB’s TCF Programme and the NT Policy 
Document aim to ensure investor protection through strengthened market conduct 
regulation. The regulations seek to address the information asymmetries and agency 
costs associated with the financial sector. Recent private equity scandals highlighted 
the specific risks caused by a lack of transparency and disclosure.  
(i) The Fidentia Asset Management Scandal 
The Fidentia Group was under the control of Mr. J. Arthur Brown. Fidentia Asset 
Management (FAM) was the group’s main business. 230 Analysis of the Fidentia case 
and others has shown that without proper management, as well as observance of 
good corporate governance, stakeholders’ risk exposure can be amplified.231 
Based on reports by the provisional curators and FSB inspectors, the Fidentia 
Group was placed under final curatorship,232  as it could not account for R680 
million of the almost R2 billion under FAM’s management.  
The private equity firm used an ECP as the investment vehicle. Partnership 
agreements were entered into between FAM and its investors. The FSB inspectors 
found that investors’ funds were used to cover expenses of the business, and private 
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equity investments for the Fidentia Group.233 The investments held by FAM on 
behalf of investors were concealed.234  
The legal requirements that a company must comply with before operating as a 
FSP are an obstacle to entry. This obstacle was lower at the time Fidentia entered the 
industry. There was no real differentiation amongst FSPs.235 
FAM failed to fulfil any of its duties as required. It also failed to submit 
audited financial statements (AFS) as required for the year ending February 2005.236  
By using clients’ money to pay for business expenses, FAM did not act in good 
faith.237 The assets under the administration of FAM were ‘artificially disguised to 
misrepresent the nature of the investments’ (FSB, 2007:13).238  FAM and its staff did 
not act honestly or fairly,239 in the interests of its clients or in accordance with the 
integrity of the financial services industry.240  
The conduct of the fund’s affairs was regulated by the agreement, and fiduciary 
duties, and not the legislation. In this way, FAM avoided further disclosure and 
transparency to the detriment of investors. 
(ii) Tri-linear Asset Management Scandal 
The Tri-linear Asset Management (Tri-linear) Scandal presents another example of 
corporate scandals in the private equity industry. 241 The FSB used its power to 
revoke the licences of Tri-linear, which is at the centre of the disappearance of more 
than R100 million in trade union members’ savings and pension funds. Tri-linear 
engaged with investors, specifically the South Africa Clothing and Textile Workers 
Union (SACTWU) using a trust, the Tri-linear Empowerment Trust (TET).242 Due to 
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inadequate disclosure between the fund and the asset management firm, this resulted 
in a loss of the funds’ money.243  
The fund manager failed to disclose the investments, and had applied the funds 
in an inappropriate manner, contravening the Pension Funds Act.244 Fraud charges 
have been laid against the Tri-linear fund managers, and the trial continues.245  
Tri-linear managed five SACTWU provident funds. The FSB suspended the 
firm from November 2007 to May 2008 due to its failure to provide financial 
statements. However, during this period, Tri-linear continued to invest clients’ funds, 
ignoring the suspension. After the suspension was raised, a whistle-blower reported 
Tri-linear’s activities. The FSB only responded seven months later.246 The inspectors 
found that the five pension funds had placed R314 million with Tri-linear, of which 
R66 million was sent to Canyon Springs, which later used R27 million to invest in 
three unlisted companies. The inspector’s report which was handed to the FSB was 
only acted on in 2011. The FSB withdrew Tri-linear’s license as an asset manager. 
However, the time taken to act on the allegations and report back resulted in Tri-
linear making further investments, which resulted in further losses to investors.247  
As noted above, the Tri-linear asset managers are currently involved in court 
proceedings. Criminal as well as civil charges have been instituted.  
(iii) Possible Influence on the Proposed Regulations.  
The fund scandals have had a profound effect on the financial services sector. As 
noted above, regulators anticipate that the TCF Policy and the NT Policy Document 
will serve as tools for the holistic regulation of the industry and promote investor 
protection.248 The purpose of the proposed regulations is to limit the corporate 
malpractices investors have been exposed to as well as the risks inherent in the 
industry.  
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The regulators seek to promote laws that are complete, harmonised and 
integrated with a focus on outcomes and contract terms and costs.249 Through the use 
of new consolidated market conduct laws, and not simply fiduciary duties and 
contract, the regulators seek to achieve their objectives. It should be noted, however, 
that that new onerous regulations are open to criticism. The limitations of the 
regulations are discussed further in Chapter 5.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that the South African private equity industry has 
experienced growth, and it is poised to grow further in the future. Key to the growth 
of the industry has been changes in its regulation and South Africa’s regulatory 
policies that allow pension funds and the PIC to invest directly in private equity 
funds.  
The main regulators of the private equity industry in South Africa are the FAIS 
Ombud, the FSB, and the self-regulatory SAVCA. This chapter has shown that South 
Africa adopted a ‘hands off’ approach to the regulation of funds, as opposed to hedge 
funds which are now regulated in terms of the CISCA. This approach is evident in 
the FAIS and FSB’s minimal registration requirements and the reluctance to 
scrutinise private equity activities, until that activity deals with capital markets and 
only where there has been or appears to be unlawful activities. However, the 
implementation of the TCF Programme and the NT Policy document will have a 
profound effect on the market.  
This chapter has shown that the funds’ structure, through the use of an ECP or 
a bewind trust has encouraged private equity investments. However, there has been a 
lack of transparency and disclosure requirements for private equity investment 
vehicles, save for pension funds investing in funds, and the PIC promoting CRISA. 
This has led to agency costs and information asymmetries. Improved transparency 
and disclosure to investors could promote continued growth and address the concerns 
raised in respect of this industry.250   
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Regulations on the management of private equity investment are limited to the 
requirement to disclose information relating to the firm’s financial position as a 
company in compliance with the Companies Act,251 and in compliance with the FAIS 
Act as an FSP. This is a commendable requirement, as it promotes a high standard of 
accounting. However, transparency and disclosure obligations of the fund to 
investors are limited, and their only means of protection is the common law and 
negotiated contractual terms.252 This could affect investor confidence.253 The TCF 
Policy and NT Policy Document seek to promote future growth by providing a 
holistic framework for adequate investor protection. Nonetheless, it is possible that 
the implementation of the TCF Policy and NT Policy Document could inhibit 
economic growth by overregulating or implementing inappropriate regulation of 
financial institutions. 
The UK and the USA have specific regulations in place to regulate the private 
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4. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S 
REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
4.1 Introduction 
The UK and the USA jurisdictions represent the leading economies in developed 
markets.254 Assessing these jurisdictions will provide insight into the application of 
financial regulation and voluntary self-regulation in promoting corporate governance 
in the form of transparency and disclosure. As noted in Chapter 3, concerns raised 
with regard to the private equity industry call for an investigation of this industry’s 
growth, its key regulators and existing regulations, and a critical assessment of the 
regulatory policies.   
In the UK and USA, funds are subject to specifically tailored regulation,255  
and the overall financial services regulatory regime. Regulation in both jurisdictions 
is based on the acknowledgement that collectivised investment, 256 management 
relationships and intermediary vehicles increase the risk of malfeasance and fraud.257 
Similar to the approach applied in South Africa, investment firms in the UK and the 
USA are bound to comply with the company and securities legislation. 258 In the UK, 
the UK Corporate Governance Code (Combined Code) seeks to promote investor 
protection and sound corporate governance by traditional companies while the 
corresponding legislation in the USA is the Public Company Accounting Reform and 
the Investor Protections Act of 2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Investor protection and corporate governance in funds have not been addressed.  
There has been limited critical legal assessment of governance structures in these 
funds; instead, the focus has been on the manner in which private equity affects 
portfolio listed companies.259 Compared to the vast body of research on disclosure 
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and transparency in capital markets, funds’ reporting and information obligations to 
their investors have been neglected by scholars.  
This chapter discusses recent investor interest in the growing area of private 
equity, and examines the regulatory framework and the main regulatory bodies in the 
UK and the USA. It also discusses the specific rules that govern private equity 
investment.  
4.2 Private Equity Funds in the UK  
In response to the GFC, 260 the financial services industry in the UK has undergone a 
number of changes. 261 The main change has been a move to a new system of 
financial services regulation. The ‘twin peaks’ system subjects insurers and banks to 
supervision by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) for prudential matters, and 
asset managers are supervised by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) for market 
conduct issues. The private equity industry has witnessed a shift from exclusive 
attention to the safety of individual financial institutions, to an emphasis on the 
health and stability of the financial system holistically. 262  The recent reforms in the 
UK also include the passing of the European Union (EU) Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) into law. The AIFMD applies to the UK by 
virtue of its membership of the EU. The AIFMD includes variations to the marketing 
of certain investment schemes and the forms of investment vehicles which exist in 
the UK.  
(a) Form of Private Equity Funds  
Each investment fund is structured to address the unique characteristics of the 
investment vehicle. 263   
A private equity fund’s governance structures are determined by the choice of 
the legal vehicle, as well as the nature, demographics, and the number of the 
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participants in the fund.264 Limited partnerships (LPs) have become the chosen 
investment vehicles for various reasons which include tax, and regulatory 
deficiencies.265 However, following the recent reforms, an analysis of the regulations 
is necessary to ensure that the tax efficient vehicle does not inadvertently lead to 
issues relating to marketing and regulatory permission.266  
As oppose to South Africa, LPs in the UK are formed under the Partnership 
Act 1890 (1890 Act).267 They are registered under the Limited Partnership Act 1907 
(1907 Act). In terms of Section 4 of the 1907 Act, a LP is defined as having one or 
more limited partners (LP’s) whose liability is limited to the contributed capital 
amount, and one or more general partners (GP), who are liable for all the obligations 
and debts of the partnership, 268 provided they are not involved in management.269 
Governance arrangements for LPs are flexible. The 1907 Act sets out limited 
rules with regard to the division of the GP and LPs’ responsibilities, other than the 
prohibition of LP’s being involved in the partnership’s management.  The LP is 
governed by the general law on partnerships. With regard to fiduciary duties, a 
partner owes co-partners fiduciary duties, and a duty is placed on the partner to be 
truthful in their relations with third parties, irrespective of whether or not the 
transaction is of a partnership nature.270 Section 28 of the 1890 Act provides that a 
partner must offer co-partners a true account and the fund information about the 
affairs of the partnership. Furthermore, in terms of Sections 29-30 of the 1890 Act, 
there is a duty not to compete with the partnership and make secret profit.  
As noted by Spangler, even prior to the 1890 Act, the courts acknowledged that 
the fiduciary relationship is of central importance in the partnership: 
‘[i]f fiduciary relationship means anything I cannot conceive a stronger case of 
fiduciary relation than that which exists between partners [in partnerships and 
limited partnerships]. Their mutual confidence is the lifeblood of the concern. It is 
because they trust one another that they are partners in the first instance; it is because 
they continue to trust each other that the business goes on.’271 
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However, it is submitted that the investor may not be able to assert their fiduciary 
duties in the partnership agreement, and may only discuss the disclosure and 
transparency terms after the agreement has been entered into. 
Whilst a partnership can be entered into without it being in writing, a limited 
partnership agreement must be in writing, due to the need for registration.272 The 
investment fund is formed by a written agreement which sets out the rules and 
arrangements of the LP. It also sets out the relationship between the investors and the 
investment managers.  
An LP is a form of a business organisation, and a form of contract.273 As a 
business organisation, shareholders of a corporation exercise more control than the 
limited partners in an LP.274 As stated by Rosenberg, limited partners are analogous 
to ‘disguised creditors’.275 There is an imbalance of power, which is derived from the 
nature of the LP itself. As a form of contract, the participants in the fund have the 
freedom to establish the contractual terms they feel are important without being 
bound to follow company law. Rosenberg asserts that this has meant that partnership 
agreements have become susceptible to power dynamics, and the agreements have 
reduced the duties owed by the GP to the LPs.276 It is noted that this arrangement is 
not mandated by the law, as well as the scope of the terms negotiated by the parties 
which can give effect to the duties. This also applies to the ECP in South Africa. 
(b) The General Regulatory Framework 
The general private equity regulatory framework in the UK consists of the relevant 
legislation, formal bodies and industry associations.  
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) is the legislation for the 
regulation of asset management in the UK, as well as various other mechanisms 
contained in the FSMA.277 
The FSMA regulates financial and investment services in the UK.278 It does so 
through the concept of ‘regulated activities’ that are carried out by individuals with 
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authorisation, or who are otherwise able to obtain release from the authorisation 
requirement.279 The Financial Services Markets Act 2000 Regulated Activities Order 
2001 (the Regulated Activities Order),280 set out the regulated activities which are 
carried out by corporate entities in association with the identified investments listed 
in the Regulated Activities Order.281  
The list of specified activities includes: 
1) Arranging investment deals;  
2) Managing investments; 
3) Undertaking investments as a principal or agent;  
4) Managing and handling an alternative investment fund (AIF); 
5) Winding up, establishing, or operating a CIS; 
6) Managing collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS);282 and 
7) Investments advice.283 
Fund managers and certain investment funds also require FCA authorisation. In 
the UK in terms of Section 23 of the FSMA, it is a criminal offence for an individual 
who has not been authorised or exempted to undertake any regulated activity. Section 
21 of the FSMA prohibits a person who is not authorised from engaging in 
investment activity during the course of business. 284  
The FSMA regulates the asset management firm as oppose to the fund. 
Transparency and disclosure is to the regulator, not the investors in the fund. The Act 
does not impose specific obligations on the authorised firm to afford information to 
its investors. However, the AIFMD has changed the manner in which funds are 
regulated; this is discussed below. 
The FCA is the formal regulator of all authorised asset management firms in 
the UK.  Most investment vehicles and investment managers who require 
authorisation are regulated solely by this body. The FSMA confers a variety of 
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regulatory authorities and functions on the FCA. The FCA has extensive rule and 
code-making powers.285 The FCA has the ability issue rules that it considers 
necessary and beneficial. The FCA Handbook consolidates the rules and guidelines 
applicable to FCA authorised firms. It includes requirements for the regulatory 
guidelines, conduct of business, high level standards and comprehensive expert 
sourcebooks which apply to a range of activities and asset management vehicles.286 
The contents of the FCA Handbook are influenced by EU legislation, for example, 
the AIFMD.287 The FCA uses a number of supervisory tools to oversee the asset 
management industry. These include ‘thematic reviews’,288 which involve 
investigations into current or emerging risks relating to a specific issue or product.  
The British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA) is the 
industry association and public policy promoter for venture capital and private equity 
in the UK.289 It has served as an authoritative voice in negotiating for and speaking 
on behalf of the UK industry to a range of stakeholders.290 Similar to SAVCA, the 
BVCA describes itself as a voluntary private regulator as well as a representative of 
institutions that act in the capital and financial markets. The BVCA promotes the 
services of its members to investors, as well as providing research, training and 
networking opportunities. It also issues guidelines which its members are obliged to 
comply with when dealing with investors.291  
As noted above, private equity firms are subject to the regulations imposed by 
self-regulated associations if they are members of such associations. Private 
associations establish voluntary rules that private equity firms have to abide by if 
they wish to retain their membership. Firms have an incentive to join these 
associations as this promotes access to investors.  
With regard to the ability of the ability to address the issues and concerns, the 
FCA has significant authority to regulate the financial market and fund managers. 
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The FCA’s ability to investigate and apply its powers to ensure a healthy financial 
system is commendable. These powers have now been given greater latitude in light 
of the effect of the AIFMD in the UK.  
While the BVCA promotes disclosure and transparency on the part of the 
private equity fund, its ability to deal with issues and concerns is limited. 
Membership is voluntary and funds that are not members may simply avoid applying 
transparency and disclosure.  
As a result of recent developments, investment funds operating as LPs will 
now also be Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) for the purposes of the AIFMD. 
The AIFMD is an EU Directive which applies in the UK. Whether acting as a 
general partner or a third party manager, the fund manager will require FCA 
authorisation to manage an AIF. Following the application of the AIFMD, the 
industry has observed a number of changes for asset managers who fall within the 
regime’s scope.292 The AIFMD seeks to harmonise the regulatory requirements for 
investors and managers of AIFs in the EU.293 Its main aim is to re-establish trust in 
EU fiscal markets,294 by providing strong investor protection. The application of the 
AIFMD in the UK by means of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Regulations 2013 (AIFM Regulations) has created an additional regulatory category 
for investment funds.  
AIFs are broadly defined;295 as a result funds and other investment vehicles are 
AIFs and their administration and management fall within the AIFMD.296 
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Through the AIFM Regulations, the AIFMD requirements have been combined 
with the UK regulatory regime as well as changes to the FCA rules and guidelines.297 
They include the introduction of the Investment Funds Sourcebook (FUND). 298 The 
AIFMD Level 2 Regulation,299 contains comprehensive requirements, including 
transparency and operating conditions, leverage, and calculation of assets under 
management. 300  
With regard to authorisation, the AIFM must be approved under Part 4A of the 
FSMA to manage an AIF in the EU.301 The AIFM must comply with a number of 
requirements.302 AIFMs in the UK that are authorised under Part 4A are subject to 
the full requirements of the AIFMD, 303 in the FUND and AIFM Regulations.304 
With regard to transparency and disclosure, the AIFMD obliges AIFMs to 
make information available to investors and the FCA. 305 An AIFM must divulge the 
information specified in FUND 3.2 for each AIF it markets or manages. It is required 
to do so prior to the investment and periodically thereafter. For example, it is 
required to divulge the AIF’s risks and risk management, all the fees which are borne 
indirectly and directly by investors, and the AIFM’s investment strategy. The 
AIFMD is driven by the supposition that greater disclosure of information is better 
than less disclosure.306 In terms of FUND 3.3, an annual report must be made 
available to investors and the AIFM must report regularly to the FCA on the matters 
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set out in the FUND 3.4.307 It is submitted that under the new regime, funds have to 
provide additional information to their investors.308  
The AIFMD is not without its critics. The adequacy of the financial regulations 
has been questioned, although they do represent a step in the right direction with 
regard to investor protection. The AIFMD addresses the issues and concerns 
surrounding funds as AIFMs are obliged to make information available to investors 
and the FCA. Under the new regime, funds have to provide additional information to 
their investors.  
Although the transparency and disclosure obligations are commendable, the 
AIFMD imposes onerous duties on asset managers. This may result in the proverbial 
crossing of the Rubicon. The adequacy of the voluntary self-regulatory approach and 
financial regulation is further discussed and assessed in Chapter five. 
4.3 Private Equity Funds in the USA 
On-going economic crises have impacted USA’s financial markets.309 Congressional 
concern and increased media attention have led to panicked efforts to pass remedial 
legislation.310 Tillman critiques these measures as follows: 
‘..[I]n seeking out to put out the flames of panic and financial instability [resulting 
from the GFC], such regulations have, at times, been mismatched to the problems 
they were intended to address. Perhaps due to the sophistication of the regulated 
entities, legislators feel as if the rules must reach widely enough to encompass 
efforts to circumvent the law.’311 
Tillman is of the view that US legislators have regulated far beyond the pre-crisis 
situation, rather than adjusting the legislation to address the issues of limited 
transparency and disclosure in the private equity industry.312 The question regulators 
ought to ask is: how do they legislate and provide investor protection without 
inappropriately regulating the industry? Inappropriate regulation restricts investment 
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activity and result in investors being pushed to other jurisdictions in search of greater 
returns.313  
The private equity industry has been described as being too private in that 
limited disclosure of the funds’ activities is provided to investors.314 Following the 
1929 financial crash the USA Congress enacted various pieces of legislation to 
protect investors. They include the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the Investment Advisors Act 
of 1940. 315 By mandating open disclosure for most securities and funds, these Acts 
protect investors from potential abuse. As one commentator famously stated, 
‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’.316  
The USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) aims to protect 
investors, simplify capital realisation, and preserve fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets.317 For the purposes of raising funds in the financial markets, securities 
regulations create disclosure obligations as well as rights of action and penalties for 
any abuse of the disclosure commitments.318  However, these regulations can be 
easily circumvented due to the nature of private equity. This is done either by 
obtaining exemption from the regulations, or by structuring the fund in such a 
manner that the regulations are not applicable.319 This has also been the case in South 
Africa, and the UK.  
(a)  Forms of Private Equity Funds 
Limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability companies (LLCs), and offshore 
companies are used frequently in the USA.320 Each investment fund is structured to 
address the unique characteristics of the investment vehicle. 321  
The most common vehicle for funds in the USA is the Delaware LP, which 
grants limited liability to investors who are LPs. The fund manager acts as the GP, 
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and has unlimited liability for the LP’s obligations. The statute governing the LP in 
the USA is the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (DRULPA).322  
Similar to the position in SA and the UK, a Delaware LP consists of one or 
more GPs, and the LPs. Under the DRULPA, a GP has unlimited liability for a 
partnership’s debts and obligations towards third parties, other than the partnership 
itself and the LPs.  
The partnership agreement sets out the liabilities and duties of the partners, as 
well as to other parties. The duties include fiduciary duties,323 as discussed and 
evaluated in previous chapters. A partnership agreement may therefore restrict the 
fiduciary duties or expand the fiduciary duties that the partners may owe.324 
The courts in Delaware hold that GPs owe legal and fiduciary duties to the 
partnership. 325  These are similar to those owed by a director of a Delaware 
corporation to the LPs. The fiduciary duty of fair dealing by a GP to LPs is no less 
than that owed by a director to a shareholder.326 The arrangement of the structure 
does not lessen the duty of fair dealing by those in control of the investments.327  
The key features of the DRULPA include the following: Under the Law of 
Delaware, a substantive connection with the state of Delaware is not required to form 
a LP in Delaware. Similar to the position in SA and the UK, the disclosure of the 
identity of the LPs in Delaware is not required. However, in contrast to the position 
in SA and the UK, the DRULPA sets out a so called ‘safe harbour’ list of activities, 
that will not result in the LPs losing their limited liability.  Under the Delaware law, 
the exercise of certain rights and powers by the LPs will not constitute involvement 
in the control of the partnership business. Being involved in the control of the 
partnership results in the forfeiture of the LP’s limited liability. Sections 17-303 of 
the DRULPA 328 set out a list of activities which will not remove the limited liability 
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of the LPs. Therefore, the Delaware LP agreement can be drafted in a manner that 
offers LPs more protection.329 This is especially significant in regard to the 
governance of the partnership. LPs are able to serve on an advisory committee, 
without fear of losing their limited liability.330 For instance, the LP agreement could 
limit the GP’s power to take any action by requiring the LPs’ prior consent.  
In the UK and SA, these governance control mechanisms could be indirectly 
incorporated into the structure of the fund, using mechanisms such as setting up a 
LPs’ ‘advisory committee’. The LPs participate without acting in the capacity of 
control. However, it is submitted that only a few investors are in a position to 
negotiate such rights at the level of the GP. The other investors would have to 
depend on the South African common law, or the Limited Partnership Act 1907 in 
the UK to address governance concerns. 
A Delaware limited liability company (LLC) may be used instead of a LP.331 
The LLC is less popular. There are two primary drawbacks to using an LLC, 
especially for funds that invest outside of the USA or which have non-US investors. 
These are that LLCs are not recognised as tax transparent in some jurisdictions; and 
that, in some jurisdictions, investors and LLCs may have difficulty in accessing the 
benefits of tax treaties.332 
The Delaware Limited Liability Company Act states that controlling members 
and managers of a LLC owe duties of loyalty and care to the LLC as well as its 
members.333 In terms of a recent amendment, parties to an LLC are permitted to 
increase, eliminate, or curb fiduciary duties in the agreements. This is however 
subject to the implicit terms of fair dealing and good faith. This amendment was 
driven by the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Gatz Properties, LLC v. Auriga 
Capital Corp, November 2012.334 Transparency and disclosure terms are left to the 
parties to negotiate.  
The Cayman Islands is the most common offshore jurisdiction for a fund with a 
large investment directive. Funds in the Cayman Islands provide a comparable level 
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of limited liability to investors as that provided for by the Delaware vehicle (LP or 
LLC).   
Funds established offshore are structured as limited companies that issues 
shares.335 The affairs of the offshore company are governed by the board of directors, 
who owe fiduciary duties to the fund and its investors. This is pursuant to the 
common law and the company law of the specific offshore jurisdiction.336 Cayman 
Islands company law is primarily codified in the Companies Law (2013 Revision), 
and the Securities and Investment Business Law (2011 Revision).337Other than 
compliance with administrative obligations and requirements, the Cayman Island’s 
company law is silent on the duties of directors. The common law governs the duties 
and obligations of companies incorporated under the Cayman Islands laws. It draws 
on cases in the Cayman Islands, English common law and other cases.338 
The director’s duties imposed by the Cayman Islands jurisdiction, range from 
detailed statutory rules to the common law. The board of directors is responsible for 
ensuring that the fund complies with investment limitations and its objectives.339 The 
frequency of reporting by the fund manager and regular meetings of the board are 
important for the board to determine whether the investments are undertaken in 
accordance with the mandate, thus protecting investors.  
Investors depend on the fund manager to provide information. This is the key 
governance challenge. As stated by Spangler, although Cayman Islands law is 
founded on English common law, the Companies Law 1998 of the Cayman Islands is 
not the same as the UK Combined Code or the USA Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The 
Cayman Islands has not followed the corporate governance movements in the UK 
and the USA. Instead, it relies on a fund’s regulatory mechanisms, which in this case 
would be the fiduciary duties of the company, in terms of the common law. This is 
one of the limitations of structuring a fund as an offshore company; investors rely on 
the contractual terms of the fund. In this instance it would be the Memorandum of 
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Association (MOA) and the Articles of Association (AOA) of the offshore company. 
Imposing contractual disclosure and transparency obligations on the fund manager in 
the MOA and the AOA would deal with this issue. However, this has a limited 
effect.  
(b) The General Regulatory Framework 
The general private equity regulatory framework in the USA consists of relevant 
legislation, formal bodies and industry associations. The regulatory bodies in the 
USA include formal bodies such as the SEC and informal self-regulatory bodies such 
as the Private Equity Growth Capital Council (PEGCC). Recent regulatory 
developments include the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).340  
In the private equity industry, the federal laws of importance are the Securities 
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 
1940, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Federal securities legislation which 
regulates asset management firms does not mandate disclosure by investment funds.  
The aim of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), is to ensure adequate 
information disclosure to investors when offers are made to the public. Exemptions 
apply to the registration requirements in terms of this Act. They are available to 
certain sales and offers that either occur in the secondary market or are a private 
placement. Funds in the USA avoid the registering requirements by applying the 
exemptions of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.  
Where a matter does not involve a public offering in terms of Section 77 (2), 
one may apply for an exception. Private equity firms are able to take advantage of 
the exemption as their interests are generally offered to large pension funds and 
institutional investors, in order to take advantage of further exemptions in the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Should the sale of the interests fail to qualify for 
an exemption, the SEC has now provided safe harbour rules, known as Regulation D.  
An ‘investment company’ is defined in terms of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (Investment Company Act) as ‘any issuer of a security, which is or holds itself 
out as being engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in 
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securities’.341 The Investment Company Act was enacted to address issues that affect 
public interests and the interests of investors adversely. Preceding the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the US Congress allowed for exemptions where the exclusion of companies 
from the provisions of the Act would not harm investors or the public interest. 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, a private equity firm that was able to apply for 
exemption from the provisions of the Investment Company Act, was not subject to 
the Act’s disclosure and reporting requirements. In terms of the Act, investment 
companies are required to file a registration statement with the SEC containing its 
policies on underwriting other companies’ securities, lending and borrowing, issuing 
senior securities, investing in industries of a particular nature, buying and selling 
commodities and real estate, and portfolio turnover.342  In terms of Section 80a-44(a), 
unless the SEC determines that limiting disclosure protects investors, or does not 
harm the public interest, the registration documents are available for public viewing. 
In terms of Section 80a-29(e) of the Investment Company Act, investment 
companies must provide semi-annual reports to shareholders. The Dodd-Frank Act 
amendments are discussed below.   
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) imposes duties and 
obligations on investment advisers. An ‘investment adviser’ is defined as any person 
who for compensation participates in the business of advising others as to the value 
of securities, or the advisability of investing in, selling, or purchasing securities.343 
By advising its portfolio companies, and in recruiting limited partners, the private 
equity firm acts in this capacity.  
Unless it qualifies for an exemption, the investment adviser must register under 
the Act. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, similar to the Securities Act and the 
Investment Company Act, a private equity firm was able to obtain exemption. The 
most commonly used exemption was known as ‘the fewer than fifteen clients’ 
exemption.344 Hurdle submitted that most private equity firms had a limited number 
of funds to invest in, and due to the scarcity of these funds, a single private equity 
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firm often had less than 15 active funds in a year.345 The result was that most private 
equity firms qualified for such exemption in the USA. 
Similar to the Investment Company Act, there are many benefits of being 
exempted from the definition of ‘investment adviser’ in terms of the Advisers Act. 
Private equity firms did not have to register under the Act. They thus did not have to 
disclose financial statements or the basis for the compensation of the adviser. They 
also did not have to keep records as defined by Section (a) (37) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The public did not have access to such information, as would 
have been the case if the fund was required to disclose it.346 
The regulation of private equity firms is achieved by means of the application 
of the securities legislation in the USA. As submitted above, sunshine is the best 
disinfectant for corporate malfeasance.347 However, because private equity firms 
were able to obtain exemption in terms of the aforementioned securities legislation in 
the USA, the issues and concerns were not dealt with. Firms were able to maintain 
secrecy, and avoid making reports and disclosure. The Dodd-Frank Act abolished 
exemptions, and private equity firms are now regulated by the regulatory bodies. 
However, private equity firms are still not obliged to make disclosures to investors in 
the fund. The regulatory developments and the application of the Dodd-Frank Act are 
further discussed below. 
The formal regulatory body in the USA is the SEC and the informal industry 
association is the PEGCC. The SEC regulates investment advisers and managers 
mainly under the Advisers Act, and the Rules adopted under that statute.348 In 
response to the GFC, the US Congress adopted the Dodd-Frank Amendments to the 
financial regulatory regime.349 These changes are discussed below. 
In response to increased fraud and misconduct in hedge funds, the SEC 
adopted the Anti-fraud Rule 206 (4)-8.350 The Rule forbids advisers to investment 
companies and other investment vehicles from defrauding investors, and making 
misleading statements to them. The execution of the Rule by the SEC is through civil 
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and administrative action against advisers under Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act. 
There is no private course of action against an adviser.351 It is important to note that 
all advisers to an investment fund are covered by the said Rule. It is designed to 
protect investors in investment funds and establishments that are excluded from the 
Advisers Act’s definition of an ‘investment company’ under Section 3(a) by reason 
of either Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c) (7) of the 1940 Act.352 The Rule does not 
differentiate among the types of pooled investments.  
Advisers are prohibited from creating any materially misleading or false 
reports to investors in the fund in terms of Rule 206(4)-8(a)(1). It is irrespective of 
whether the fund is offering, redeeming, or selling securities. Participants in the fund 
have direct avenues for recourse against fund managers for malfeasance or 
misconduct on an ‘after the fact’ basis, after the tide has gone out.353 The SEC Rules 
and Regulations establish a behavioural standard for fund managers, similar to the 
position in the UK.354 However, the SEC does not go as far as to mandate 
governance or structural parameters for funds.  
The private equity industry association and public policy advocate for the 
industry is the PEGCC.355 The PEGCC works with all branches of government, and 
institutions to foster a better understanding of how entrepreneurship and private 
equity influences the US economy. It enables private equity firms and entrepreneurs 
to be active in the policy development process. Similar to the SAVCA, and the 
BVCA, the PEGCC describes itself as a voluntary private regulator and as a 
representative of establishments that are active in capital and financial markets.  
The PEGCC’s professional development programmes aim to improve 
knowledge and encourage information sharing on best practices, research, and 
strategy.356  As the voice of the US private equity community, the PEGCC empowers 
its members by advocating for policies that inspire innovation and reward long-term 
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investment. Members must comply with certain requirements, including a 
professional approach before and after an investment is made.357 
The Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA) Guidelines are also 
considered by members of the PEGCC. The ILPA aims to promote advancement in 
private equity practice by refining the GP and LPs relationship. It has published a set 
of private equity principles that encourage sound governance, transparency, and 
alignment between fund managers and investors’ interests. 
As noted above, private equity firms are subject to voluntary regulations 
imposed by self-regulated entities if they are members of certain associations. Firms 
are encouraged to become members as this promotes access to investors.  
With regard to the effectiveness of addressing the issues and concerns in 
relation to funds, the regulatory regime provides participants in the fund with 
avenues for direct recourse against fund managers for malfeasance or misconduct on 
an ‘after the fact’ basis, after the tide has gone out.358 
In response to complaints by investors, the cases taken up by the SEC have 
involved charges under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Advisers Act. 
The SEC’s focus has been on protecting investors and addressing aspects of funds 
which have raised investor protection concerns.  The SEC’s enforcement efforts have 
revealed that there is a pattern of fund managers engaging in fraudulent activities, to 
the detriment of investors. In some cases, this involved fund managers 
misrepresenting their fund’s performance.359 Other cases involved outright fraud and 
theft.360 A theme that runs across the cases is manipulated valuations and false 
reporting. 
While the SEC’s efforts to address misconduct are commendable, it has its 
limitations. There are limitations to ‘rule-making’ through enforcement.361 
                                                          
357 Supra 355.  
358 Warren Buffet op cit (n17). 
359 In SEC v Coadum Advisors, Inc., the SEC filed complaints against two individuals who controlled 
a group of six fund vehicles. In connection with a securities offering, the companies raised $30 
million from 150 investors by misrepresenting how the money would be invested. They also 
misrepresented the supposedly earned profits, made $3 million in loans to themselves and disbursed 
$5 million to related parties. Litigation Release No. 20475 (4 March 2008). The defendants were 
ultimately found guilty. Litigation Release No. 21406 (3 February 2010).  
360 In SEC v Northshore Asset Management Litigation Release No. 20632 (1 July 2008). 
361 Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan ‘Is it the law or the lawyers?’ Investment Fund Covenants 
across Countries’ (2006) 12 European Financial Management 535. 
60 
 
Enforcement provides protection after the fact, and in some instances, miscreant fund 
managers may not be in a position to pay back misused funds to investors. It is 
submitted that increased transparency and disclosure to investors would serve a 
greater purpose and ensure adequate investor protection. Exposing malfeasance 
‘before the tide has gone out’ as opposed to ‘after the tide has gone out’ would offer 
increased protection to investors. 
Similar to the SAVCA and BVCA, the PEGCC’s ability to address the issues 
and concerns relating to the private equity industry is also limited. Because 
membership is voluntary, its reach extends only to asset managers who are members. 
Those who are not members may simply avoid applying the PEGCC’s standards. 
However, and again similar to the SAVCA and the BVCA, membership of the 
PEGCC enables asset fund management firms to attract investors. 
With regard to regulatory developments in the USA, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) transformed the 
traditional ‘hands off approach’ to private equity.362 Prior to the Act’s enactment, 
fund managers used exemptions to evade registration, record keeping, and reporting 
requirements of the Advisers Act.363 Despite the intentions of the regulators and 
Congress, the practical effect of the exemptions by the time Bernie Madoff was 
imprisoned were that a management company could escape the domain of the 
SEC,364 by gaining exemption.   
The US Congress responded to concerns over investor protection365 by passing 
the Dodd-Frank Act that abolished exemptions for asset management firms, thus 
addressing the unregulated nature of the private investment industry. This led to a 
rise in the number of advisers registered with the SEC. In February 2010, the 
Director of the Division of Investment Management of the SEC, Andrew J. Donohue 
stated: 
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‘[t]he USA securities laws have not kept pace with the growth and the market 
significance of the hedge funds and the private equity funds, and as a result the 
Commission [SEC] has very limited oversight authority over these vehicles… 
Consequently, advisers [fund managers] of private equity funds can ‘opt out’ of 
Commission oversight. This represents a significant regulatory gap in need of 
closing.’366 
For Donohue, requiring the managers of these funds to register with the SEC would 
provide the essential ability to oversee the industry and protect investors in these 
funds.367 As stated by Spangler,368 this would be accomplished by means of fund 
managers providing the SEC with complete and reliable information about the 
investment funds’ operations, and their impact on the country’s securities markets, 
while allowing the funds to maintain flexibility with regard to investment strategies. 
The Dodd-Frank Act thus brought fund managers under the direct regulation of 
the national financial regulator. Spangler noted further that in light of the amount of 
assets managed by fund managers, exemption from regulation and oversight by the 
SEC had become an anomaly,369 especially when compared with the approaches 
adopted by other industrialised countries.370 
The promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Act means that domestic and foreign 
fund managers who were previously exempt from registration under the Advisers Act 
are now subject to SEC registration.371 Domestic investment advisers in the USA 
holding$100 million or more of assets under management have to register with the 
SEC.372 However, if private investment funds are managed by advisers,373 that are 
not considered to be a ‘venture capital fund’, the threshold is raised to $150 million 
or more in assets.374 Where these thresholds are exceeded, advisers must register 
under the Advisers Act. The latter threshold will capture unregistered advisers to 
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hedge funds and private equity which profited from the exemptions375 that were 
eliminated by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The Dodd-Frank Act and the AIFMD impose similar requirements on fund 
managers’ activities.376 However, the AIFMD goes further, and is harsher in its 
directive than the Dodd-Frank Act. The AIFMD applies the ‘maximalist’ 
approach.377 
The reporting requirements for advisers have been modified by the Dodd-Frank 
Act. Additional record keeping and reporting commitments are imposed on 
registered advisers as well as advisers previously exempt from registration. The SEC 
has the power to issue rules requiring unregistered advisers to maintain and deliver 
the information the SEC requires, in the interests of the public and for the investors’ 
protection. However, the SEC does not define the requirements these reports and 
records must meet.378  
While the Dodd-Frank Act is a welcome new direction in regulating the US 
financial services sector, the compliance requirements imposed on fund managers are 
limited, and do not address the concerns and issues discussed earlier.379 The Act 
simply builds on the securities legislation implemented prior to its enactment and 
makes it applicable to unregistered investment advisers.380 No direct transparency 
and disclosure obligations to investors are imposed.  
The Dodd-Frank Act’s ultimate effectiveness is unclear. While the SEC is 
central to the US approach,381 since the GFC and the increase in its responsibilities 
under the Dodd-Frank Act, issues such as its lack of resources have come to the 
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fore.382 Observers in the US have maintained that the Act has failed to improve the 
regulatory regime in the country.383 
The modifications brought about by the Act increased the SEC’s duties, but the 
governance of funds ultimately remains outside its scope.384 Investors themselves 
will need to take decisive steps to address the issues and concerns relating to the 
governance structure of these funds.  As one commentator has observed: 
‘[t]here has been a growing consensus that there should be more regulation of hedge 
funds and private equity funds, although there is a substantial difference between the 
USA and the European Union (EU) [UK] as to what the scope and the content of 
that regulation should be. The Dodd-Frank Act takes the ‘minimalist’ approach.’385 
As noted by Spangler, by applying the EU AIFMD, the UK has adopted an onerous, 
‘maximalist’ approach to regulation.386 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined how the UK and the USA, as leaders in the private equity 
industry, have sought to address the issues and concerns relating to the private equity 
industry by regulating this sector.  
The UK has applied the twin peaks model, and has sought to regulate the 
financial services industry in a holistic manner. Also, prior to the application of the 
EU AIFMD, the regulation of the fund was based on a general ‘hands off’ 
approach.387 The implementation of the AIFMD introduced a new approach to 
private equity in the UK. By means of the AIFM, the AIFMD now regulates 
disclosure to investors in funds and the regulator. As a commentator noted, the 
AIFMD adopts a ‘maximalist’ approach.388 This chapter has indicated that while the 
AIFMD is a welcome change, it places onerous burdens on investment managers in 
alternative investment funds. This may lead to a focus on conformance as opposed to 
performance of the investment fund objectives. 
In the USA, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, investment fund managers were able 
to obtain exemptions; this shrouded the private equity industry in secrecy. The Act 
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mandated the SEC to regulate fund managers. The Dodd-Frank Act is a welcome and 
commendable regulatory development in the USA. However, while it regulates 
specific private equity investment managers, and calls for disclosure of information 
to the SEC, it does not address all the issues and concerns. The SEC’s ability to 
protect investors is limited. The promulgation of the Dodd-Frank Act resulted in an 
increase in the number of advisers registered and the SEC now requires more 
resources in order to apply its powers and assess investment adviser reports.  
Investment advisers are now obliged to report to the SEC and keep proper 
records. However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not provide for direct transparency and 
disclosure to investors. This is left to the investor to pursue by means of governance 
mechanisms. As noted, the legal mechanisms of the investment vehicle are largely 
inadequate in addressing the issues and concerns relating to the private equity 
industry. As a commentator observed, the Dodd–Frank Act has adopted a 
‘minimalist’ approach. 
Compared with the approach adopted in South Africa, the methods adopted in 
the UK and the USA, are instructive and commendable. However, they fail to 
adequately address the identified issues and concerns. On the one hand, the UK has 
adopted an onerous ‘maximalist’ approach, whereby securities regulations now 
inappropriately regulate the private equity industry. On the other hand, the USA has 
adopted a meek, ‘minimalist’ approach, in that the regulations place onerous duties 
on the SEC and fail to address the specific issues and concerns identified in relation 
to funds.  
For South Africa to achieve its objective of becoming a lucrative market for 
private equity investment, it will need to find a balance between the onerous and 
meek approaches adopted by the UK and the USA, respectively. The approach 
adopted should addresses the issues and concerns raised in relation to the private 
equity industry; ensuring effective investor protection is imperative for the continued 
growth of this sector.389 South Africa will need to strike a balance and avoid crossing 
the Rubicon by inappropriately regulating the private equity industry.  
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The following chapters discuss the adequacy of the voluntary self-regulation of 
industry associations and financial regulation in addressing the issues and concerns 






















5. THE VOLUNTARY SELF-REGULATION AND REGULATORY 
APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
The private equity industry has witnessed a growth in self-regulatory initiatives and 
formal financial regulations.390 As noted by private equity industry associations, 
these developments have been motivated by the need to avoid top-down regulation 
by regulators. While regulators have sought to regulate this industry, the changes 
adopted have been incomplete and at times inappropriate. The regulations are 
embodied in the AIFMD in the UK and the Dodd-Frank Act in the USA.391  
There are a range of possible regulatory choices, including industry self-
regulation and intervention by regulators. As one commentator notes 
‘[t]he industry self-regulation [by industry associations] and the governmental 
intervention [paternalism] are being considered in order to lower the level of risk and 
to redress the balance between investors and the private equity firms...’392 
As noted in previous chapters, funds previously avoided regulators and legislators’ 
scrutiny. 393 However, increasing concern regarding investor protection and potential 
costs to investors resulted in regulators stepping up their regulation of funds and their 
asset managers without necessarily understanding the private equity asset class. This 
resulted in inadequate and inappropriate regulation. Flexibility and innovation are 
hallmarks of successful private equity investments. Effective regulation calls for an 
approach which not only ensures investor protection, but promotes innovation. Thus, 
the regulatory approach needs to be both effective, and appropriate.  
A private equity fund’s internal arrangements are structured by the contract 
which brought it into existence.394 The contractual flexibility of the investment fund 
enables investors and fund managers to enter into specific schemes and contractual 
terms that support their interests and reduce agency costs.395 The contractual basis for 
funds was adequate in addressing agency costs at the time when private equity was 
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popular and successful. However, when transparency and disclosure to investors is 
limited, the risks of fraud and malfeasance may increase, resulting in a decrease in 
investor confidence.396 Legislators have thus intervened in order to promote investor 
protection.397  
The question is whether the current regulatory regime in South Africa that is 
characterised by limited regulatory intervention is well-matched to address the issues 
and concerns relating to the private equity industry. As one commentator noted, the 
level of regulatory intervention will increase where there has been a high profile 
failure in the market. Fraud and conflicts result in losses to investors.398 The Fidentia 
and Tri-linear scandals are clear examples.399   
McCahery and Vermuelen note that the private equity industry faces the 
difficult task of finding well-suited solutions, which increase the level of disclosure 
and transparency, and reduce the risks that investors are exposed to. This needs to be 
achieved without undermining the benefits and flexibility of the private equity model 
that has thrived on restricted interference in contractual dealings.400  
As noted by Cumming, in evaluating whether a regulatory reaction is required, 
it is imperative to identify the best system and to establish whether the existing 
framework is appropriate to address the issues and concerns relating to fund 
investments.401 
From a South African perspective, funds are exposed to risks, which include 
decreased investor confidence resulting from inadequate disclosure and transparency. 
In determining the type of reaction required, the choice is between voluntary self-
regulation, and other regulatory policies.402 This chapter evaluates and analyses the 
effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation and imposed regulation.  
(a) Voluntary Self-Regulation 
Voluntary self-regulation refers to the principles and industry codes and guidelines 
tailored specifically to funds by industry associations. Industry codes and guidelines 
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assist investment firms and investors in the fund to address the issues and 
uncertainties associated with such funds. The question is whether these guidelines 
improve the contractual governance of funds. The guidelines and standards address 
the current issues facing these funds that remain outside of regulatory regime, such 
as disclosure and transparency.  
An example of an industry code is the SAVCA Code of Conduct.403 This Code 
was planned in consultation with professionals in the industry. The SAVCA Code 
provides a set of voluntary processes that centre on the funds’ investment decisions, 
and the contractual circumstances which cover investments.  
The recommendations supplement other guidelines and standards that aim to 
improve transparency. The SAVCA Code sets standards for record keeping, in order 
to ensure that the records accurately describe the services provided. According to the 
Code, fund agreements should detail agreed investment objectives and investment 
powers.404 A comparable set of guidelines was produced in the UK by Sir David 
Walker’s working group for the BVCA on disclosure and transparency in the private 
equity industry.405  
The Walker Guidelines are a voluntary set of rules applied on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis. They require increased disclosure by private equity firms and 
portfolio companies. Similar to the SAVCA Code, the transparency requirements 
include filing an annual report and financial statements on the company website 
within four months of the end of the financial year.406 This serves as a way to 
communicate their trade and the governance organisation of their firm.  
The Walker Guidelines did not envisage the need for statutory provisions on 
disclosure and transparency in the UK.407 The Walker Group expected that the 
principles, the BVCA’s active role and monitoring and reviewing the funds would 
offer the necessary enticement for private equity firms to fulfil the guidelines. 
However, the Walker Guidelines were not given legislative effect when the UK 
adopted the ‘twin peaks’ model, and the EU AIFMD came into effect (see Chapter 
four).   
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It is submitted, that the self-regulatory mechanisms of the SAVCA can play an 
important part in responding to calls for increased disclosure and transparency in 
relation to equity fund’s capital structure and management practices.408 The 
advantage of the SAVCA approach as opposed to the legislative approach is the 
flexibility it offers and the fund’s ability to adapt to the regulations.409 Cost is another 
advantage. An increase in legislative regulation increases the cost of undertaking 
private equity investments which is passed on to the investor. The SAVCA voluntary 
regulations avoid these disadvantages.410 They also enable the FSB to focus on its 
objectives, as opposed to applying onerous requirements.411 
The principles of the SAVCA Code have an advantage over mandatory 
regulations. As a commentator noted: 
‘… [w]e need flexibility in practice… to have ‘one size fits all’ is not possible, and 
legislation on governance takes the focus off enterprise. This in turn impacts the 
ultimate social and economic responsibility of a company, which is performance, not 
conformance.’412 
The private equity firm will be adversely affected if inadequate or inappropriate 
legislation is adopted.413 The firm’s performance as an agent of a fund will be 
affected by the focus on conforming to regulations. Principles are more effective than 
rules and regulations.  
One of the criticisms levelled at the Guidelines and the Codes, is that they are 
not legally binding.414 However, effective private monitoring solutions and co-
regulation would provide a mechanism for legal enforceability which the Codes lack 
on their own. This is further discussed in Chapter six.  
Another concern is that, as noted above, the Guidelines and Codes offer an 
aggrieved investor limited courses of action. Furthermore, private monitoring 
solutions are a means to promote governance, and not an end in itself. It is submitted 
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that they lack ‘normative content.’415 Nonetheless, it is submitted that private 
monitoring solutions and co-regulation, together with the Guidelines and the Code, 
could provide a legal framework and the normative content which would address 
governance challenges and investor protection. At the same time, they would ensure 
the flexibility of private actors in reacting to changes in market practice.  
(b) Regulatory Approach 
With the increase in regulation, it is submitted that national regulators have been 
given extensive responsibilities to achieve the objectives and priorities set by their 
governments.416 The regulation of funds is limited to indirect regulation, by 
regulating the fund manager.417 However, the approach adopted in the UK applies 
directly to the fund, by virtue of the AIFMD. 
The recent changes introduced by the AIFMD in the UK and the Dodd-Frank 
Act in the USA were discussed in Chapter four. However, many important issues and 
concerns with regard to the governance of funds have not been addressed by the top-
down regulatory regime, or when addressed, have offered inappropriate solutions. 
Funds have either been inappropriately regulated or not regulated at all. The limits of 
financial regulation were demonstrated by the examples of the UK and the USA.  
The AIFMD and the Dodd-Frank Act offer lessons to South Africa. The net effect of 
the regulations varies.418 On the one hand, the cost of doing business has increased. 
This raises the risk of investors moving to other jurisdictions that are less 
regulated.419 On the other hand, a regulatory gap can reduce the appeal of these 
jurisdictions.420 With regard to legislative regulations, it is submitted that the 
inflexible nature of mandatory legal rules prevents private equity firms from making 
innovative investment decisions which are a key characteristic of the industry.421  
The AIFMD and the Dodd- Frank Act also imposed onerous duties on formal 
bodies like the FCA and the SEC, respectively.422 While the regulations have 
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increased their duties and objectives, regulators’ ability to deal with the issues and 
concerns are limited. This was clearly indicated by the SEC’s calls for more 
assistance from the United States Congress in applying the Dodd-Frank Act.423  
With regard to the AIFMD, increased regulation has moved to a point where 
the regulators have regulated the industry inappropriately. Firstly, the AIFMD places 
a duty on the fund manager to divulge information to investors, but the information 
provided is limited in its usefulness. Increasing the amount of information disclosed 
will not always promote knowledgeable investment decisions. As noted by 
Paredas,424 overburdening investors with information can have the opposite effect. 
Furthermore, onerous disclosure requirements push investments to less regulated 
jurisdictions. In terms of the AIFMD, the fund manager is subjected to onerous 
disclosure requirements in terms of investment strategies. A balance is required. It is 
submitted that the AIFMD crosses the Rubicon by regulating private equity 
inappropriately.   
The analysis of the legislative protection of investors in funds has shown that 
current efforts have either adopted the meek, ‘minimalist’ approach, which is 
inadequate or limited, or the onerous, ‘maximalist’ approach, inappropriately 
regulating the industry. It is submitted, that as long as regulators fail to address the 
governance challenge of investor protection directly and appropriately, private 
monitoring solutions and co-regulation strategies are alternative approaches which 
the industry and regulators should consider. 
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6. APPLICATION AND EVALUATION OF APPROACH 
6.1 Introduction 
Commentators have emphasized that risk in private equity investments is increased 
by asymmetric information and agency problems.425 These problems affect the 
relationship and interaction between the investors and the fund manager. Specific 
contractual provisions and governance strategies are required to address these 
problems.426   
The problems arise from the agent’s (private equity firm) lack of ability and 
opportunistic behaviour that act against the interests of the investor.427 Zambelli 
notes that in the absence of appropriate control mechanisms, agency problems and 
information asymmetry may lead to ‘adverse selection’ (the problem of hidden 
information), as well as a moral hazard (the problem of hidden action).428 Zambelli 
asserts that the moral hazard problem is driven by the divergence of interests 
between the principal and the agent.429 To mitigate these problems, 430 appropriate 
mechanisms need to be adopted to enable the fund manager to perform in the fund’s 
best interests, and deter him/her from opportunistic behaviour. The economic 
literature and empirical evidence (e.g., Gompers 1995; Kaplan and Stromberg 2004; 
Cumming 2012) have shown that investors in funds have developed various 
strategies to mitigate the underlying risk and agency problems.431  
As noted in chapter four, increased interest in private equity transactions has 
sparked debate on whether investment advisers and funds should be subject to 
greater information disclosure and registration. The USA and the UK illustrate two 
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opposing approaches, and offer lessons for the future regulation of the industry in 
South Africa. It is imperative for the South African regulatory environment to find a 
balance between the meek, ‘minimalist’ and the onerous, ‘maximalist’ approach.  
(a) Monitoring Risk Mitigation Strategy 
Two monitoring strategies are used to address the limited disclosure and 
transparency of funds; these involve investors and transactions.432 The strategies are: 
the disclosure and reporting requirements of the fund manager and the private equity 
fund; and investor protection and governance measures.  












Risk mitigation mechanism based on Zambelli. 433 
The disclosure of financial information and operations of the private equity 
fund, including the valuation of investments, is an effective tool to prevent 
misconduct on the part of investment managers.434 The disclosure of information 
during the course of investments as opposed to after the fact enables investors in the 
funds to make informed investment decisions. It is, however, submitted that the mere 
receipt of information will not eliminate fraud, negligence and malfeasance. More is 
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required if investors are to exercise their rights. Monitoring therefore requires the 
ability to access information as well as the ability to process it so that the correct 
conclusions can be reached.435 
The growth of the private equity industry calls for the institution of innovative 
regulatory measures. This chapter evaluates possible solutions to the issues and 
concerns relating to this industry. Monitoring strategies include private monitoring 
solutions, and co-regulation solutions (co-regulatory).  
(i) Structural Approaches – Private Monitoring Solutions 
One of the monitoring strategies that are applied to mitigate potential risks is the 
application of structural approaches to the private equity fund.  In order to address 
governance concerns, an agreement can be reached between investors and the fund 
manager on fund documentation.436 This can be achieved by the use of side letters 
between a single fund investor and the fund manager, and/or an advisory 
committee.437 Both solutions could enhance disclosure and transparency.  
A side letter is a written agreement between the investor and a fund or between 
the investor and the fund manager.438 The side letter supplements the private equity 
fund’s offering documents, bewind trust deed, partnership agreement, and 
subscription documents. It offers individual investors better preferential terms than 
those offered to other fund investors.439 Therefore, the effect of entering into a side 
letter agreement is to customise the commercial and legal relationship with a single 
investor without affecting the relationships with other investors in the fund. 
A side letter with the private equity fund, or the manager of the fund, is one 
way to address the governance challenge in funds440 to promote investor protection. 
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Specific amendments are made to the documentation of the fund to address the 
concerns of an individual investor. In side letter agreements, investors seek special 
terms and conditions to govern their investments. Such agreements accommodate the 
legal and regulatory needs of the specific investor.441 The most common terms are 
requests for additional information.442 These could include details about the decision-
making process with regard to investments, modified reporting requirements, and 
details about the underlying investments undertaken by the fund.443 A single investor 
in a fund is capable of connecting bilaterally to the fund manager and/or the private 
equity fund; these contractual mechanisms address the governance challenge.444 
Fund investors may be in a position to negotiate a term in the side letter that 
entitles the investor to nominate a representative to serve on the funds’ advisory 
committee.445 As noted in Chapter three, participating in the advisory committee 
would provide access to information on the manner in which a fund manager is 
fulfilling his/her duties.446 An advisory committee can be composed of investor 
representatives, and senior personnel from the investment fund. The advisory 
committee’s functions include resolving conflicts of interest and an approval 
mechanism for investments that would otherwise be outside the scope of the fund.447 
With regard to partnership funds, steps should be taken to safeguard that involvement 
in the advisory committee is not considered to be participation in the partnership.448 
This would result in the investor losing their limited liability.449  
With regard to the advisory committee, as noted, individual parties who engage 
in management activities could risk losing their limited liability. A commentator 
observed that: 
‘[t]he legal default rule of limited liability of investors [in limited partnership] also 
reinforces the separation of ownership and management and again creates the 
potential for agent misconduct. The implications of the liability rules reaffirm the 
notion that the general partner controls the operation of the business and is 
personally liable for partnership debts. The limited partner’s protection from liability 
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has been traditionally tied to the idea that they avoid excessive intervention in 
managerial decision making. When private equity investors participate in 
management, they create a small chance that they too may be exposed to potential 
liability under the control rule and other legal principles that tie liability to 
conduct.’450 
Unlike the USA DRULPA, 451  the UK 1907 Act and South African partnership 
common law do not provide a list of activities the LPs may engage in without losing 
their limited liability. The UK 1907 Act provides LPs with little guidance as to what 
constitutes ‘management’ activity. With regard to advisory committees, considering 
the effect of taking part in ‘management’, LPs have been cautious and have remained 
on the side lines. It would thus be helpful to draw up a list of activities LPs that may 
engage without fear of losing their limited liability.   
While side letters offer a meaningful way to address the governance challenge, 
they do display weaknesses that need to be taken into account. The value of a side 
letter may be limited where investors are unable to assess the information provided to 
them.452 Since private equity is a complex asset class, institutional investors require 
skills to analyse the information provided.453 Another criticism is that investors are 
not treated equally, which would be of concern to regulators. Side letters undermine 
the equal treatment of investors, yet investors assume that the treatment would be on 
a pari passu basis. This could be the source of the FSB’s concern over the use of side 
letters.454 
Therefore, there can be practical limits to the use of side letters in private 
equity, due to the issues that arise in their negotiation and implementation.455 
Furthermore, entering into a side letter is the first step in an on-going process of 
monitoring and oversight.456 Such monitoring and oversight rests on the investors 
who entered into the side letter. It is submitted that, regardless of the criticisms, side 
letters offer positive benefits. An effective side letter offers investors improved 
governance of the fund, to the extent of their participation in the fund.  However, 
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side letters are a possible solution for only one or a few fund investors. It is 
submitted that alternative approaches that address the governance challenges 
confronting all investors in a fund are preferable to an approach which serves one 
interest over others. Such an approach would require an analysis of governance 
mechanisms within and outside the fund vehicle.  
(ii) Co-Regulatory Approach 
As noted in previous chapters, there are several approaches to the regulation of 
private equity, including contractual regulation, voluntary self-regulation, legislative 
regulation, and co-regulation.457 The individual application of each of the methods 
has limitations. Each of these methods has been applied individually to address 
disclosure and the transparency of the fund to investors.  
As noted in previous chapters, membership of self-regulatory organisations is 
voluntary. It is submitted that the law can enforce compliance with the private equity 
standards developed by self-regulatory associations. By setting minimum 
requirements for information disclosure, the law protects small institutional and 
indirect private equity investors. An approach which combines the methods of 
regulation is referred to as co-regulatory approach.458 A number of studies have 
identified co-regulation as the best method to regulate funds. 459 
There are many advantages of co-regulation, including legal certainty and the 
predictability of legislation, together with the flexibility offered by self-regulation.460 
Co-regulation offers the possibility of compliant engagement which involves private 
equity firms selecting from a selection of mechanisms to manage a particular 
issue.461 Firms adopt co-regulation in order to attract investors and enhance their 
reputation.  
In South Africa, pension funds and the PIC are examples of this approach. In 
terms of the Pension Funds Act,462 pension funds are required to apply ‘The 
Conditions’ when investing in private equity. ‘The Conditions’ require the pension 
fund to comply with the SAVCA, which promotes disclosure and investor protection. 
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In terms of the PIC, they apply the CRISA. The CRISA calls for investment in funds 
with adequate governance mechanisms, and requires disclosure to investors. The 
SAVCA Code and the CRISA are examples of the manner in which investments are 
undertaken, and illustrate co-regulation’s place in the regulatory milieu. The co-
regulatory approach adequately addresses the issues and concerns relating to the 
private equity industry and promotes disclosure and the transparency of the fund. 
Adopting this approach would offer investors a mechanism to enforce industry 
associations’ codes and guidelines in their agreements with fund managers.  
As opposed to the approach adopted by the UK, and the USA, South Africa 
should reconsider its approach to private equity regulation. Co-regulation is the most 
efficient approach. It includes contractual terms protection, voluntary self-regulation, 
and legislative enforcement of the standards developed by self-regulatory 
associations as well as disclosure requirements which are in the best interests of all 
indirect and institutional private equity investors. Co-regulation offers effective 
investor protection, and promotes the flexibility of private equity structures. It is thus 
an appropriate approach that offers solutions to the issues and concerns relating to 

















The study sought to address the issues and concerns relating to the private equity 
fund and contribute to our understanding of private equity as an asset class.  
Private equity funds have operated with limited or no transparency and 
disclosure. Thus, the study’s primary objective was to suggest an approach that 
would protect investors and efficiently and effectively regulate the private equity 
fund.  
Due to inadequate investor protection, fund managers have been able to 
disregard their duties and engage in misconduct.463 This has resulted in a loss to 
investors, which has reduced investor confidence.464 The issues and concerns raised 
illustrate the governance challenge with regard to funds.465 While there is a rich body 
of literature on transparency and disclosure on the part of companies and capital 
markets, there is a paucity of research on reporting and information disclosure by 
private equity funds.  
The growth of private equity and the various fund scandals, highlight the need 
to address governance challenges in this sector.466 All the while the market was 
experiencing gains, and functioning efficiently, the contractual arrangements and 
governance mechanisms of investment vehicles were adequate to address these 
issues and concerns. However, misconduct on the part of fund managers was 
revealed ‘when the tide had gone out’.467 South African regulators have thus sought 
to place the private equity industry in the regulatory spotlight.  
The jurisdictions analysed have sought to address concerns about investor 
protection either through the meek, ‘minimalist’ regulatory approach, or the onerous, 
‘maximalist’ regulatory approach.468 It is submitted that there is a need to avoid over-
regulation or inappropriate regulation of the industry. This requires an understanding 
of this asset class. 
                                                          
463 The Fidentia, and the Tri-linear scandals, among others.  
464 Cumming op cit (n27) 336. 
465 LYutao et al op cit (n73) 54. 
466 Banerjee op cit (n107) 158. 
467 Warren E. Buffet op cit (n17). 
468 Greenough et al op cit (n379) 49. 
80 
 
In light of the regulatory approaches applied by the UK and the USA, it is 
submitted that incomplete and inappropriate regulations have been adopted by the 
regulators. On the one hand, a healthy, stable and lucrative market requires efficient 
investor protection; while on the other, the market requires an approach which does 
not deter investment. 
It is submitted that the South African private equity industry faces a tough task 
in adopting a regulatory approach which is able to promote transparency and 
disclosure, and reduce the risks that investors are exposed to. The approaches applied 
in the UK and USA, are opposite sides of the private equity regulatory coin. A 
balance is required between voluntary self-regulation measures, meek regulatory 
measures and onerous regulations.  
This study found that voluntary self-regulatory measures and the meek 
regulatory approach fail to address the specific governance challenge concerning 
transparency and disclosure by the fund to investors. The self-regulatory measures 
lack legally binding provisions, while the meek regulatory approach regulates the 
investment firm as opposed to the fund directly.  
It is further submitted that the adoption of an onerous regulatory approach has 
imposed onerous requirements on funds, limiting their flexibility to engage 
innovatively in transactions. Such regulations fail to ensure investor protection, due 
to a misunderstanding of private equity as an asset class. The regulatory approach 
applies a one-size-fits-all model that may result in limited success in ensuring 
investor protection and promoting investment in the economy. With the regulatory 
approach, fund managers become too focused on conforming as opposed to the 
performance of the fund, which limits investment returns.469 This approach fails to 
promote innovation in the private equity asset management industry, which is a key 
characteristic of this industry.  
Monitoring strategies have been documented which address the issues and 
concerns relating to funds, which involve investors and transactions. These strategies 
include the disclosure and reporting requirements, and investor protection and 
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governance measures.470 Monitoring strategies to address the governance challenge 
include private actor measures such as the use of side letters and advisory 
committees, as well as co-regulation.471  
It is submitted that the use of side letters and advisory committees addresses 
individual concerns and issues. Side letters promotes disclosure and the transparency 
of the fund to individual investors. An advisory committee addresses these concerns 
as it is privy to investment decisions. However, these solutions have limitations in 
holistically addressing the issues and concerns relating to the private equity industry. 
They have the potential to cause further problems such as the potential loss of the 
limited liability of a LP when an investor serves on an advisory committee. 
Therefore, co-regulation is the best option to effectively and holistically address 
investor protection in the private equity industry.  
Co-regulation addresses the concerns and issues relating to funds. The co-
regulatory approach provides the balance between the meek approach and the 
onerous, ‘maximalist’ approach to private equity regulation. Co-regulatory solutions 
present an ability to regulate the private equity industry appropriately and effectively, 
contributing to its efficiency. The approach includes contractual terms protection, 
voluntary self-regulation, and the legislative enforcement of the standards developed 
by self-regulatory organisations. 
The South African regulatory milieu currently applies a general ‘hands-off’ 
approach to fund regulation; they are regulated indirectly, at the level of the fund 
manager. This is similar to the meek regulatory approach.  
The analysis of the diverse approaches to the regulation of the private equity 
industry revealed that there is limited investor protection. As opposed to the 
approach applied in the UK via the AIFMD, and the USA via the Dodd-Frank Act, 
and in light of the TCF Policy Document and National Treasury policy document, 
South Africa should assess and re-evaluate its approach to private equity fund 
regulation. This study concludes that the most efficient approach is co-regulation that 
avoids the one-size-fits-all model. As noted, it imposes minimum disclosure 
requirements which are in the interests of all indirect and institutional private equity 
investors.  
                                                          




As illustrated earlier, a balance is required; it is submitted that the new South 
African regulatory approach should avoid inappropriate regulation of the private 
equity industry.  Co-regulation is the ideal approach as it promotes flexibility, and 
allows asset management firms to focus on performance as opposed to conformance.  
Co-regulation offers a balance in addressing the issues and concerns in this 
industry; it advances investor protection, and promotes the South African private 
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